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Abstract 
In this thesis I investigate how important transfer mispricing has been in the construction of 
the current Norwegian petroleum tax regime. Transfer mispricing has real world 
consequences, and recent studies (Pak, 2012, p. 36) show that in the time span 2000-2010 
over $110 billion have disappeared through mispricing of crude oil in the EU and the US. By 
doing a case study of the Norwegian case more information might uncover about transfer 
mispricing. I create a typology with six considerations, and test how important each of these 
have been in eight propositions concerning changes to the petroleum taxation. My findings 
show that transfer mispricing is not the most important consideration when changes have been 
made to the Norwegian tax regime for petroleum. I find that efficiency and fiscal 
considerations are the most important considerations over time. But transfer mispricing is an 
important consideration for tax officials when they make changes to the petroleum taxation 
system, in the sense that transfer mispricing is a problem that is constant over time and the 
officials have created an approach to the arms length principle, the norm price system, which 
is designed to control transactions between companies operating on the Norwegian shelf and 
stop transfer mispricing from happening.    
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1 Introduction 
Transfer pricing is not illegal. It is a normal commercial transaction that takes place every 
day, all over the world. It occurs whenever two companies, who are owned by another 
company, with each of them being located in different countries, trade with each other 
(Nieckels, 1976, p. 4). Transfer mispricing however is a strategy where two related companies 
set a price that differs from the market price. In this way the multinationals can shift income 
from a high-tax area to a low-tax area even though the profits were earned in a high-tax 
country; the tax base is shifted out of the host country (Dunn & Mutti, 2000, p. 198; Dunning, 
1981, p. 31; Glomsrød & Osmundsen, 2005, p. 3; May, 2001, pp. 1595-1596; Pak, 2012, p. 8; 
Pugel, 2009, p. 355; Rugman & Eden, 1985, p. 1; Weiss, 1998, p. 171). Michael Hudson 
provides a good description of this problem in the petroleum sector in the 1960’s, and it 
shows that transfer mispricing has real-world consequences. He writes that “The industry 
seemed almost to be a charitable operation, investing billions of dollars in exploring and 
drilling for oil, building refineries and putting together vast shipping networks, all without 
making a profit” (Hudson, 2000). He was assigned to gather information about transactions 
involving international payments by a number of oil companies in the 1960’s. He was 
perplexed by the findings and went to Jack Bennett, who was the treasurer of Exxon at that 
time, and asked him where they made their profits. The answer was that they “(…) were made 
right there in his office” (Hudson, 2000). His job was to identify where profits would be taxed 
at low rates, which was in tax havens like Panama and Liberia (Hudson, 2000).  
Low-cost oil produced in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia was sold to shipping affiliates in 
Panama and Liberia. The transactions were invisible for the oil ministers in Saudi Arabia 
because they appeared under “international” in the U.S. balance of payments statistics and not 
assigned to any specific country. The shipping affiliates then sold the oil (at very high prices) 
to refineries in North America and Europe. The oil companies also avoided paying taxes to 
European governments, because the transfer price was high enough to show no profits for the 
refineries. The profits were made in tax havens like Liberia and Panama, where the oil 
companies used branches of U.S. banks to coordinate the transfer payments. The oil 
companies maximized their profits by eluding high tax regimes in Europe and North America 
(Hudson, 2000).  
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The problem with tax evasion by the oil companies has also been reported in Alaska, which is 
an oil rich state in the US. In a case from the 1980’s concerning cheating by the oil 
companies, Stiglitz (2007, p. 25) found that, in addition to selling oil to subsidiaries at a lower 
than fair market value, the oil companies found other ways to increase their total profits. E.g. 
it was decided that the oil companies had to pay 12.5% of the gross receipts, minus the cost of 
transporting the oil from the site. So to increase their profits, the oil companies just 
overestimated their costs by a few pennies per gallon. The state then used tens of millions to 
detect this behaviour by the oil companies, millions that could have been used in more 
important areas of society (Stiglitz, 2007, p. 25). In a more recent study, Pak (2012) found 
that in the time span 2000-2010 over $110 billion have disappeared through mispricing of 
crude oil in the EU and the US. Furthermore he also pointed out that transactions from tax 
havens are more or less invisible in his analysis, because the published import data only 
shows where the oil originally comes from (Pak, 2012, p. 36). This means that there might be 
hidden statistics here that can make the issue of transfer mispricing even more extensive than 
it already is.  
Pak’s study takes us back to Hudson’s description of the petroleum industry in the 1960’s, 
where tax havens played an important part. As was mentioned earlier multinational 
companies often establish offices in so-called tax havens, states where there are very low or 
no taxes, in order to maximize their profits. An example of this is the small state of Delaware, 
in the US. Here over 285,000 businesses have their legal address. The reasons for establishing 
a dropbox here varies between each company, but one reason might be to minimize taxes 
paid. According to the New York Times this loophole has over the last decade reduced taxes 
for businesses with operations in other US states by an estimated amount of $9.5 billion 
(Wayne, 2012). Statoil is one of the companies that have a legal address in Delaware. Statoil 
is a Norwegian oil company that is partly owned by the Norwegian government. From 1972 
to 2001 the state was the only owner of Statoil (Regjeringen, 2013a), but this has changed 
over the years and the current state ownership share is 67% (Meld. St. 13, 2011, p. 94). Statoil 
has 25 subsidiaries in the US, and 23 of them are registered in Delaware. There are no 
employees, but an agent represents the company in the state (Seglem & Sverdrup, 2012). 
When confronted with this information, Statoil answered that the company doesn’t save taxes 
by being registered in Delaware, and argued that it is the industry friendly, just and 
predictable legislation that is the main reason (Stavanger Aftenblad, 2012). But it is hard to 
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escape the simple fact that Delaware is an ideal place to siphon funds from host countries, in 
order to reduce global taxes paid for the multinational companies.  
The Norwegian case might be very helpful in acquiring more knowledge about transfer 
mispricing; a mapping out of how the Norwegian government has faced issues like transfer 
mispricing, and which motivation has been important in this process, might help uncover how 
important transfer mispricing is when setting up a tax regime for the petroleum sector. 
Countries with large natural resources have had problems with benefiting from their natural 
wealth, a problem that is often referred to as “the resource curse”. Throughout history there 
have been many examples of this (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz, 2007, p. 1). Norway is a 
resource rich country, and in 2007 the Norwegian government had 31% of its total income 
from the petroleum industry (Osmundsen, 2010, p. 435). They have in other words been able 
to escape this curse, and this is also what makes the Norwegian case interesting. I am going to 
map out how Norway has been able to manage its petroleum reserve so that the revenues 
benefit the public, not just the multinational enterprises. In particular, focus is turned to the 
problem of transfer mispricing.  
 It is quite clear that this is an important issue, and multinational enterprises have a lot of 
leeway in the present regime. Things have changed since the 1960’s, but the need for more 
information on transfer mispricing is evident. The thesis’ main task is to map out which 
considerations were important when officials first sat down to write the laws for the 
petroleum sector, and what changes have been made in the Norwegian petroleum taxation 
over the years. The main objective is to evaluate how important transfer mispricing has been 
in this process. Transfer mispricing is relevant because several countries are struggling with 
it, and there are a good deal of attempts (by various host countries) trying to deal with this 
problem. Implementing and designing fiscal regimes for the extractive industry “(…) is now a 
major focus of IMF policy support and technical assistance” (International Monetary Fund, 
2012, p. 7). 
The main question in this thesis is: How important has transfer mispricing been in the process 
of building the Norwegian tax regime for the petroleum industry? By answering this question 
I might also be able to find out what has changed in this regime since it first was introduced in 
1965, and what other considerations there are when establishing a tax regime for the 
petroleum industry. To measure how important transfer mispricing has been, is somewhat 
challenging, but by mapping out what changes have been made over the years, and how the 
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policymakers have prioritized, it might be possible to identify this. I have done this by 
ranking six considerations in eight propositions concerning changes to the petroleum taxation, 
and the findings indicate that the Norwegian approach to the arm’s length principle, the norm 
price system, is the current solution to transfer mispricing, and that it has not changed since its 
implementation in 1975. Also I find that compared to other considerations, transfer mispricing 
has not been the most important consideration, but that the threat of it is constant over time. 
This argument is based in the simple fact that the norm price system is still a part of the 
petroleum tax regime.   
The project has some theoretical and empirical challenges because very little is done on this 
subject and “Data on transfer prices is hard to come by” (Rugman & Eden, 1985, p. 7). 
Determining how extensive this problem is can also be challenging because “How far MNEs 
actually do manipulate intra-group prices to transfer income across national borders is still a 
matter for empirical research; so far the evidence collected is partial and impressionistic” 
(Dunning, 1981, p. 31). To overcome these challenges I have decided to employ a descriptive 
approach, with a document’s analysis of changes to the Norwegian Petroleum act from 1975. 
By doing this I hope more information will emerge concerning how important a consideration 
of transfer mispricing has been when changes have been made to the act. I have focused 
attention on eight propositions regarding changes to the petroleum tax regime. In each of 
these propositions I have analysed what was the most important motivating factor for the 
change, and ranked them from 0 (not important) to 3 (very important).  
In the next part, chapter two, I present a typology of six taxation considerations: fiscal, 
allocation, administrative, evasion, efficiency and transfer mispricing. An Official Norwegian 
Report (NOU 1989:14, p. 93) has been used as a point of departure. In this report the first five 
considerations are lifted up as being important when a system is being built up or changed. 
Transfer mispricing is not specifically mentioned in that report, which indicates that transfer 
mispricing is not an important consideration, but to answer my main question I have made it a 
consideration. I describe what distinguishes a tax regime that is most geared to each of these 
considerations. By doing this I will be able to separate them. And in order to answer the main 
question about how important transfer mispricing has been in the process of building the 
Norwegian tax regime for the petroleum industry, a measure of importance has been 
established in chapter three.  
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In chapter three the case study is presented. More specifically this is a hypothesis generating 
case study (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691-692). This method is selected because very little theory 
exists on transfer mispricing and the evidence of it is impressionistic and partial (Dunning, 
1981, p. 31). I have identified 43 propositions that address changes to the petroleum taxation 
on the Norwegian shelf. From these 43 I have picked out eight important propositions that are 
highlighted in chapter four. Each of these eight propositions are treated as cases. In each case 
I search for the six considerations, and rank them with an importance scale. This scale varies 
from 0 (not important) to 3 (very important), and is more thoroughly presented in chapter 
three. The remaining 35 propositions are included in the appendix, with a description of what 
they pertain. I also identify which of the six considerations is most important in 15 of them, 
but in 20 of the propositions I have not been able to assign what consideration is most 
important.   
Chapter four is the analysis chapter. Here I work through each of the eight cases, and rank 
which of the six considerations are most important in each case. At the end of each case a 
table is presented that shows what ranking each of the considerations has been given. In 
chapter five I discuss how the importance of transfer mispricing has changed over time, and 
what trends are evident. In chapter six my findings are summarized. Here I also address my 
main concerns about the sampling strategy and the operationalization of importance. There is 
a chance my case selection has had an effect on my findings. I have identified 43 propositions 
that discuss changes to the Norwegian petroleum tax regime. The reason I have only analysed 
eight propositions in chapter four, is that it would have taken too much time and space to 
analyse all 45, and that is why I have chosen eight propositions that are spread across time. 
But we would have achieved the best result if all propositions had been analysed. Another 
aspect that might have had an effect on my findings is the way I have operationalized 
importance. But I argue that these concerns have not had an impact on my conclusion that 
transfer mispricing has not been the most important consideration when changes have been 
made to the Norwegian tax regime for petroleum, but that it is a problem that is constant over 
time. 
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2 Theory 
One way of identifying why Norway has been able to keep the revenue within its borders is to 
study how the tax regime has changed since oil first was discovered on the Norwegian shelf, 
and which considerations have been important in the construction of the current regime. In 
order to evaluate this, one has to identify which considerations the government value when 
making changes to a tax regime. In this chapter a typology of six considerations is 
established. I will describe what we are looking for in the data for each of these. This is done 
for all the considerations, so that one can separate them. An importance scale, which varies 
from 0 (not important) to 3 (most important), is established in chapter three. Thus, after 
testing each of these considerations up against one another, in each regime change, it might be 
possible to rank the different motivations for changes in the petroleum tax. In this way we can 
see if transfer mispricing has been important, and which other considerations have been 
important in the construction of the Norwegian petroleum taxation system. Since transfer 
mispricing is not mentioned as one of the considerations in NOU 1989:14 a more detailed 
description is presented. I have chosen to have transfer mispricing as a consideration, and this 
might affect my results, since transfer mispricing can overlap with the other considerations. In 
section 2.1.7 I take a closer look at how the considerations might overlap with each other, and 
potential problems with having transfer mispricing as a consideration.   
2.1 Considerations 
Generally there are several considerations Norwegian officials have to evaluate when they are 
establishing a new tax regime, or making a change in an existing regime. In NOU 1989:14 
they point to five considerations: fiscal, allocation, efficiency, administrative and evasion 
(NOU 1989:14, p. 93). Since my main focus is on transfer mispricing I have decided to 
include it with the five other considerations, making the total of considerations into six. Tax 
treatment, especially in connection with transfer mispricing, is the most important subject I 
will address. In the following part I will describe what distinguishes each of these 
considerations in a tax law, and what we will find in the documents if one consideration is 
more important than the others. This is done for each of the six considerations. When this is in 
place it is possible to compare the importance of each up against one another, by searching in 
the documents for what the officials have chosen to focus on. After identifying what I am 
looking for in the documents, I might be able to answer my main question: How important 
has transfer mispricing been in the construction of the current Norwegian tax regime for the 
 8 
petroleum industry? In so doing I might also identify what considerations the tax officials 
value the most when changes are made to the regime.  
2.1.1 Fiscal considerations 
The taxation is supposed to provide the government with income so that it can finance public 
sector activities and transfers (NOU 1989:14, p. 93). These are called fiscal considerations. 
The fiscal terms cannot be too tough; this could lead oil companies to search for oil in other 
areas with more favourable tax rules. If the fiscal terms are too generous the returns to 
government are weakened (Nakhle, 2010, p. 90). The government has to find a balance 
between these two in order to achieve the best outcome both for the oil companies and 
themselves. How is the regime organized when fiscal considerations are important? In order 
to capture most of the profits the government has to implement taxes that secure the 
government with most of the revenues, and in this regard a taxation based on the profits from 
the oil companies is a good choice. But a production-based taxation is a good alternative if the 
government wants to secure income from the industry from the onset. With this kind of 
taxation the government does not have to wait until the oil company makes a profit. As soon 
as the oil company has produced oil the government receives revenue from the activity. Any 
change in the law that secures the government more of the profits will indicate that fiscal 
considerations are important.  
2.1.2 Allocation considerations 
Allocation considerations are also important objectives for the taxation of petroleum. The tax 
should affect the allocation of income between people, and thereby provide a just allocation 
of welfare (NOU 1989:14, p. 93). How is the regime organized when allocation 
considerations are important? The regime will be organized in a way that distributes the 
profits equitable between the government and the oil companies. The oil companies are 
entitled to some of the revenues, but the oil resources are owned by the Norwegian state. The 
large portion of the profits should therefore benefit the society. There is not one tax in 
particular that ensures this, only the rate of the tax. If the proposition emphasize that a change 
is made to influence the allocation of income between the state and the oil companies so that 
it is more equitable, it will indicate that allocation considerations are important. Fairness is a 
keyword here.  
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2.1.3 Efficiency considerations 
Efficiency considerations are the third consideration. Some taxes have a negative effect on 
extraction efficiency. If the resource is not efficiently extracted, it is negative for both the oil 
companies and the government; the government wants to maximize the potential of the 
resources, and the oil company wants to sell as much oil as it can. The tax might e.g. 
influence the oil companies’ decision to close down oil fields (as is often the case with 
royalties (Glomsrød & Osmundsen, 2005, p. 2)); but it is both in the government’s and in the 
oil companies’ interest that oil is effectively extracted. In addition to this the government 
wants to maximize its share of the revenue by having a high tax rate, but it cannot be too high. 
Because then it might influence Norway’s competitiveness when it comes to attracting 
activity from oil companies. The oil companies might decide to search for petroleum in areas 
where the overall tax rate is lower than on the Norwegian shelf (NOU 1989:14, p. 93). 
Furthermore the taxation has to be built on a principal of neutrality; the different incomes 
have to be taxed with the same rate. If they are not it might lead to investments that does not 
give the highest return (before tax), because investors want to optimize their investments with 
the aim of a higher yield after tax (Syversen, 1991, p. 37).  
Another issue that relates to efficiency considerations is asymmetric information. The oil 
company has a lot of expertise in the extraction of oil (costs, risks etc.) while governments 
might not. In a situation with only one company interested in the oil the government might be 
in a bad position. When there are a number of companies wanting to have the license to look 
for oil this will not be a problem, because the government will have several companies to 
choose from (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007:5). How is the regime organized when 
efficiency considerations are important? If this is an important consideration the government 
will implement taxes that urges the oil companies to extract as much oil as possible from the 
oil fields. Taxes that have negative effects on investments e.g. will be left out from the 
taxation. Profit based taxation are taxes that urges the oil companies to extract as much oil as 
possible, since they are not levied a tax unless a profit is made. Production based taxation can 
have negative effects on investments, because the oil companies are in this case levied a tax 
as long as they are producing, and if the cost of producing is higher than the revenues the oil 
companies will not extract the oil. In addition to this government will be interested in 
attracting more oil companies to the shelf, so that there is more competition for the licenses.  
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2.1.4 Administrative considerations 
The tax should not be too expensive to manage for the tax administration or the taxpayer 
(NOU 1989:14, p. 93). These are called administrative considerations. To determine profits 
one has to value the production and also other revenues that might be included. In addition to 
this costs have to be established (Calder, 2010, p. 321). This requires the administration to 
have a lot of information from the oil companies concerning their revenues. Therefore profit 
taxes present administrative problems, and increase the opportunity for corruption (Calder, 
2010, p. 323). However, Syversen (1991, p. 41) points out that this consideration is not as 
important as the other considerations. This is because the oil sector has a specialized tax 
administration, which is capable of mastering a complicated set of rules. So if Norwegian 
officials find a more complex regulation that improves the system, administrative 
considerations are not likely to affect their determination of implementing the change. How is 
the regime organized when administrative considerations are important? A production-based 
taxation is most likely employed if these considerations are important, because this tax is 
simple to administer (Calder, 2010, p. 320; Glomsrød & Osmundsen, 2005, p. 2; Radon, 
2007, p. 104). If a change is made in order to make the taxing cheaper or easier to manage it 
will indicate that administrative considerations are important. 
2.1.5 Evasion considerations 
Evasion considerations are the fifth consideration. The tax system should be devised in a way 
that limits tax evasion (NOU 1989:14, p. 93). How is the regime organized when evasion 
considerations are important? These considerations can be considered to be important if the 
government implement changes to the taxation that prevents the oil companies from 
siphoning profits made on the Norwegian shelf to other countries where tax rates are lower. It 
is naïve to think that the taxpayer will not use those opportunities that exist to make profits on 
the shelf as low as possible, in order to evade the tax levels on the shelf. There are several 
ways of avoiding this. One way is to implement a tax based on how much oil the oil company 
produce. The Norwegian government knows how much oil they have, and this makes it easy 
to control how much they are entitled to. Another way to ensure profits stay in Norway is to 
set down a committee that supervises all of the transactions between subsidiaries in the same 
company. This committee would also have to set a price for oil, since many of the companies 
trade between different parts of the same company. The arm’s length principle is used to 
determine this price; by stating that the price paid for the oil should be the same as if the two 
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companies had no commonality of interest. If the oil companies report a lower price than the 
arm’s length price, the government can levy an extra tax or some other sanction.   
2.1.6 Transfer mispricing considerations 
Transfer mispricing is not specifically mentioned in NOU 1989:14, but one can argue that it 
can be placed under several of the considerations mentioned above, and especially under 
evasion considerations. Since transfer mispricing is not mentioned in the report, a more 
detailed description is presented in this section. Most of the oil companies that are operating 
on the Norwegian shelf are multinational enterprises, meaning that they are active in many 
countries at the same time. Often there are a great deal of buying and selling internally in 
these companies (NOU 2000:18, p. 159), and this is what is called transfer pricing. As 
mentioned before transfer pricing occurs whenever two companies, who are owned by 
another company, with each of them being located in different countries, trade with each other 
(Nieckels, 1976, p. 4). When two unrelated companies trade with each other, they come 
together and negotiate a price for the product in question. The price reached is viewed as fair 
and set by the market. This is what is called the arm’s length price (Tax Justice Network, 
2013; United Nations, 1999, p. 9).  
When a company owns subsidiaries in two countries it might set an artificially low price for 
tax purposes (i.e. the lowest overall tax rate) (Pugel, 2009, p. 355; Mullins, 2010, p. 388), like 
Hudson’s (2000) example showed. E.g. if a multinational enterprise has its main offices in 
Norway, a subsidiary in Brazil and another subsidiary in Canada. The company produces a 
product in the subsidiary in Brazil, and sells it in Canada. Let’s say the corporate tax rate in 
Brazil is 50% and 10% in Canada. Instead of pricing the product with the same amount in 
Brazil and Canada, the multinational sets a lower price when it sells the product to Canada 
from Brazil. Thereby it increases its profits by avoiding the high tax in Brazil. This is called 
transfer mispricing/transfer pricing manipulation/abusive transfer pricing (Tax Justice 
Network, 2013). The private sector parties want to maximize their profits, but this has a 
negative effect for the host country because their revenues will be minimized in this process 
(Stiglitz, 2007, p. 23). The potential to set a lower price when selling between subsidiaries is 
high, and it is important to note, “(…) one-third of the world’s international trade in goods 
occurs as intrafirm trade between units of the multinational enterprises located in different 
countries” (Pugel, 2009, p. 356).  
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As the example above explains, transfer mispricing is a strategy that can shift income from a 
high-tax area to a low-tax area even though the profits were earned in a high-tax country; the 
tax base is shifted out of the host country (Dunn & Mutti, 2000, p. 198; Dunning, 1981, p. 31; 
May, 2001, pp. 1595-1596; Pak, 2012, p. 8; Pugel, 2009, p. 355; Weiss, 1998, p. 171). The 
company sets prices on things that move between different units in the company. These 
include financial capital, finished products, components and materials. The multinationals sets 
a price on these various products and sells them to subsidiaries or affiliates. To increase 
profits for the multinational it strives to reduce global taxes paid (Pugel, 2009, p. 355). E.g. in 
2011 the Norwegian Tax Administration found that multinational companies had tried to 
evade taxes of a total of 16.7 billion NOK by trading within the same company (Sættem, 
2013). The former Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, stated that the government 
wants to close tax loopholes and also gain more insight into various tax havens (Dagens 
Næringsliv, 2013). In the resource sector there are many opportunities for transfer mispricing, 
and the oil industry serves as a good example. Oil goes through many processes: extraction or 
production, distribution, marketing and refining. Each of these can occur in different countries 
(Mullins, 2010, p. 389). 
The arm’s length principle is a conventional approach to deal with abusive transfer pricing. It 
says, “(…) a transfer price should be the same as if the two companies involved were indeed 
two unrelated parties negotiating in a normal market, and not part of the same corporate 
structure” (Tax Justice Network, 2013). It is endorsed by both the United Nations Tax 
Committee and the OECD, and used in bilateral negotiations between governments. It is not 
likely that the OECD will embrace a new approach, and they will probably uphold the arm’s 
length principle in the future (The Economist, 2013).  
In the propositions the Norwegian officials might point out that multinational enterprises, like 
oil companies, can trade between subsidiaries in other countries, and in so doing set a price 
that is lower than the market price. From the description above it is also likely that if transfer 
mispricing has been an important consideration the government will probably be responsible 
for setting an arm’s length price. In addition to this they will have to supervise the 
transactions between subsidiaries in the companies that are operating on the Norwegian shelf.  
2.1.7 Considerations that overlap 
Efficiency considerations can overlap with fiscal considerations. Because even though 
efficiency considerations are aimed at making the extraction more effective, it might also 
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have an effect on fiscal considerations. If an oil company chooses to shut down activity before 
all the oil is pumped up because the taxation regime is designed in a way that does not make it 
profitable to continue production, this would have an effect on efficiency considerations, but 
also have a negative effect on fiscal considerations. The same pattern might also emerge at 
other wells on the shelf, so that wells are shut down prematurely on several places.  Then the 
state would lose even more of the income.  
Fiscal considerations can overlap with transfer mispricing considerations. This is logical since 
the state would lose a lot of the profits if the multinational oil companies had the opportunity 
to allocate profits to other countries with lower taxes. And this takes us over to allocation 
considerations. These considerations are aimed at providing a fair distribution of the profits. 
But if the oil companies set a price that is lower than a fair market price, it will have a 
negative effect on allocation considerations. Meaning that transfer mispricing considerations 
might overlap with allocation considerations.  
Evasion considerations can overlap with both fiscal and transfer mispricing considerations. If 
a multinational oil company evades taxes on the Norwegian shelf, this would entail that the 
Norwegian state loses money. An example of this can be if an oil company places activity 
from other parts of the company on the Norwegian shelf, and receives tax cuts based on these 
costs. So by making the taxation regime less susceptible to evasive strategies, the Norwegian 
state would increase its profits from the oil industry. As I described over transfer mispricing is 
when the oil companies come together and set a price that is below fair market price, so that 
they can increase their profits from the shelf while the Norwegian state loses money. This 
means that transfer mispricing is an evasive strategy, and could have been labelled under 
evasion considerations.  
2.2 Expectations  
Based on the descriptions in section 2.1.1 to 2.1.6 I expect that: 
1) If the tax regime is aimed at fiscal considerations, we would expect to find tax policies 
that will claim more of the profits for the Norwegian government.  
2) If the tax regime is aimed at allocation considerations, we would expect to find 
changes that are aimed at making the distribution of profits from the extraction fairer.  
3) If the tax regime is aimed at efficiency considerations, we would expect to find 
measures that makes extraction from the field more efficient. 
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4) If the tax regime is aimed at administrative considerations, we would expect to find 
changes to the regime that makes it easier to administer for both government tax 
officials and tax experts in the oil companies. 
5) If the tax regime is aimed at evasion considerations, we would expect to find measures 
that are aimed at making it more difficult for the oil companies to evade the 
Norwegian taxation system.  
6) If the tax regime is aimed at transfer mispricing considerations, we would expect to 
find an approach to the arm’s length principle. 
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3 Method 
In this chapter I will present what method is used to answer the question about how important 
transfer mispricing has been in the construction of the tax regime for petroleum in Norway. 
The first section is concerned with the case study, and what kind of case study this is. After 
this description I will discuss how the cases have been chosen, and potential problems with 
the selection strategy. The second section of this chapter focuses on how each case has been 
tested, i.e. how I have chosen to operationalize “importance”. 
3.1 Case study 
In this description I draw on Lijphart (1971), who divides case studies into six types:  
atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming and 
deviant. The first two have no theoretical value, and therefore I am not going to focus on 
them. The four other types all build theory. Theory-confirming and theory-infirming both test 
established generalizations, where the theory-confirming strengthens a generalization while 
the theory-infirming weakens it. Deviant case studies tests cases that are known to deviate 
from established generalizations, and are tested because the researcher wants to find out why 
they deviate. The hypothesis-generating case study does exactly what it says: it generates new 
hypotheses where no theory currently exists (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691-692). It is in this type of 
case study my thesis on transfer mispricing fits in, because knowledge is inadequate in the 
public sector (NOU 2009:19, p. 104) and it is not clear how extensive the problem with 
transfer mispricing really is  (Dunning, 1981, p. 31). What I uncover in my analysis should 
therefore produce hypotheses that can be tested in future research.  
To do this a qualitative contents analysis is chosen (Bryman, 2012, p. 392), meaning that 
which key elements have been important in the construction of the Norwegian tax regime for 
the petroleum sector will be established. These were presented in chapter two. Each case will 
be described and tested for which consideration was most important: fiscal, allocation, 
efficiency, evasion, administrative or transfer mispricing. After doing this I might be able to 
conclude how important transfer mispricing has been in the process of building the petroleum 
tax regime. To document the process in which officials in the Ministry partake, the project 
will analyse contents in publications from the Norwegian Finance Department and other 
relevant Ministries that have had an impact on changes to the petroleum taxation. I start with 
the first law, concerning the petroleum tax law, and make a timeline up to today, to show how 
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the system has evolved since the first law was passed in 1965. By using key documents 
concerning changes in the tax regime for petroleum, I might be able to identify if transfer 
mispricing has been an important motivation for changes, or if other considerations have been 
more important than transfer mispricing. The documents I have chosen to use are propositions 
that are passed by the Parliament. Propositions might offer much advice on how the tax 
system should be formed, but some of these proposals might not make it to the actual bill. 
This is why I have chosen to focus on proposals that actually are passed by the Parliament. 
The next step is to establish when the tax regime for petroleum has changed. 
Over the years there have been many changes to the first law regarding the taxation of 
petroleum on the Norwegian shelf, passed in 1965 (Ot.prp. no. 47, 1964-1965). The first 
comprehensive law came in 1975 (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975), and after this was passed I have 
identified 41 propositions concerning the petroleum taxation. All of these changes do not 
pertain specifically to the law passed in 1975, but also other laws that have an impact on the 
petroleum tax. I have gone through all these propositions, and eight of them are focused in the 
analysis chapter. These eight propositions have been selected: 
-­‐ 1965: First instructions concerning taxation of underwater petroleum reserves (Ot.prp. 
no. 47, 1964-1965); 
-­‐ 1975: First comprehensive law about taxation of underwater petroleum reserves 
(Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975); 
-­‐ 1980: Additional sharpening of the petroleum tax (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980); 
-­‐ 1986: Revision of the petroleum tax (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987); 
-­‐ 1992: The petroleum tax reform (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992); 
-­‐ 2000: Evaluation of the petroleum tax law (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001); 
-­‐ 2010: Determining the price of gas (Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010); and 
-­‐ 2013: Changes in the tax law (Prop. 150 LS, 2012-2013). 
These cases are chosen because they brought with them large changes to the petroleum 
taxation. It would have taken too much time to analyse all 43 propositions, and this is why I 
have chosen to focus on eight propositions that are spread over time. The remaining 
propositions are included in the appendix with a description of the largest changes and which 
consideration was most important in 15 of the proposition.  
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I have also evaluated other approaches of addressing the issue of transfer mispricing in the 
petroleum industry. A comparative approach could have been interesting. We could then have 
seen how two taxation regimes differ and argue that one of them has a better solution to 
transfer mispricing than the other. But comparing two taxation systems have several 
weaknesses. E.g. which assumptions are used is not neutral to what results we get, and the 
taxation rules constitute only a part of the regulation that forms the framework condition for 
activity on the shelf (Ot. prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 17). 
3.2 Operationalizing importance 
In each case/proposition the considerations presented in section 2.1.1 to 2.1.6 will be ranked 
from 0 to 3, where 0 means not important while 3 means very important. If a consideration is 
mentioned in a proposition, but not evaluated it will be given a ranking of 1. If a consideration 
is evaluated it will be given a rank of 2. This is done to get a better picture of how the 
importance of each consideration changes over time, and also to see which consideration is 
the most important in the construction of the Norwegian petroleum tax system. To have a 
clear demarcation between rank 1, rank 2 and rank 3, I will present the general information 
about each proposition. General information is in this regard meant how many pages the 
proposition is, and which chapters of the proposition are left out of the analysis because they 
include information that is not relevant to the testing. This is done to divide the propositions 
into percentages. If more than 50% of the pages in a proposition pertains one of the six 
considerations, that consideration is given a rank of 3. If a proposition focuses less than 50% 
on a consideration, but more than 10% it is given a rank of 2. If the pages in a proposition 
contains less than 10% of a consideration, but is mentioned it is given a rank of 1.  
It can be difficult to say that one consideration is more important than the other. This is 
especially difficult when two considerations overlap, and in these cases several considerations 
can get a ranking of 3 in one proposition. In chapter five a figure and a table will be presented 
that will show how the importance of each consideration change over time. An index of the 
importance of each consideration over the entire period is also included in this section.  
The testing of each case could have been done in another way. E.g. counting how many times 
each consideration is mentioned in the propositions, and then see what consideration is 
referenced the most times in each case. But I have chosen this test because the considerations 
might overlap, and this requires a thorough examination of all the changes in every 
proposition.  
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3.2.1 Overview of rankings 
0 – not mentioned,  
1 – less than 10% of the pages in the proposition concerns one of the considerations, but is 
mentioned in the proposition, 
2 – less than 50% of the pages in the proposition concerns one of the considerations, but more 
than 10%, 
3 – more than 50% of the pages in the proposition concerns one of the considerations in the 
proposition. 
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4 Analysis 
In this chapter I analyse eight propositions concerning changes to the petroleum taxation. I 
will track changes to the petroleum taxation, and evaluate which consideration is most 
important in each tax regime. In section 4.1 to 4.8 each case/tax regime will be presented and 
tested.  
4.1 Attracting activity – 1965  
The first regulations concerning petroleum taxation were given in ot.prp. nr. 47 (1964-65), 
Om lov om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster. This proposition is seven 
pages in length, but only five of these pages provide information about why the regime was 
organized in this way. This means that if a consideration is mentioned in more than 0.5 pages 
it will be given a rank of 2 on the importance scale, since 0.5 pages is 10% of 5 pages. If a 
consideration is evaluated in more than 2.5 pages it will be ranked as 3, since 2.5 pages is 
50% of 5 pages. More than 50% of the pages in the proposition concern efficiency 
considerations. Less than 10% of them concern fiscal considerations. Transfer mispricing, 
administrative, evasion and allocation considerations are not mentioned in this proposition.  
The Norwegian fiscal system was from the onset based on neighbouring states, like the 
United Kingdom, Holland and West Germany. Throughout this proposition the United 
Kingdom’s tax regime was used as an example, and officials in Norway agreed that taxation 
levels and royalties should be close to the UK levels (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1964-1965, p. 2). This 
indicates that the government wanted to have a similar taxation system as in other North Sea 
states. This would make the Norwegian part of the North Sea just as interesting as other parts 
of the shelf, since the Norwegian taxation would not refrain the oil companies from searching 
and operating on the Norwegian shelf. The taxation system was in other words constructed so 
that it would attract activity on the shelf, and thereby increases the efficiency. With more 
companies operating on the shelf, the government would also have more alternatives when it 
came to awarding licenses to oil companies.    
This proposition from the Ministry of Finance and Customs, which was approved April 9 
1965 by the Parliament, builds on recommendations from a committee that suggested rules 
about exploration and extraction of underwater natural deposits. This committee pointed out 
three things that made the Norwegian part of the North Sea more challenging to operate in 
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than other parts of the North Sea: (1) the Norwegian shelf was on a lower depth than the 
North Sea shelf in general, which could have made it harder to extract the oil, (2) the 
Norwegian shelf was further away from findings on Holland’s shelf and (3) the Norwegian 
trench could have made it difficult to bring ashore the oil through pipes (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1964-
1965, p. 2). These uncertainties made the committee conclude  
“(…) the Norwegian continental shelf could easily seem like a less 
interesting area than the continental shelf of the Netherlands, West 
Germany and the United Kingdom. The tax load in Norway should 
therefore be adjusted to the tax load in the other North Sea states” (Ot.prp. 
nr. 47, 1964-1965, p. 2, own translation).  
At this time it was important the oil companies made investments in exploring the subsurface 
of the Norwegian shelf, and high taxes could have refrained them from doing so. Norway was 
not the only country with potentially large oil reserves in the North Sea. If the Norwegian tax 
was much larger than taxes introduced by e.g. the United Kingdom or Denmark, the oil 
companies might have prioritized exploration in those areas instead. E.g. in the United 
Kingdom the production based taxation was 12.5%. In percentage the Norwegian fee was 
lower, but it is hard to compare these figures because the UK had very favourable 
depreciation rules. It was also agreed to have an income tax of 15%, with ¾ to the tax 
equalization fund and ¼ to the municipality where the tax was assessed. It is interesting to 
note that this tax rate usually was larger in Norway at that time, but the committee had used 
tax assessment in the shipping industry as a basis for this tax. This tax was also lower than the 
UK income tax (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1964-1965, pp. 1-3). The committee therefore proposed “(…) 
the income tax for the companies etc. that are mentioned here, should partly be calculated 
after other and lower tax rates than usual” (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1964-1965, p. 3). In the long term 
these lower taxes could have had positive effects on the fiscal terms as well, since the 
government would have the opportunity to increase the taxation when the fields were fully 
developed.  
In this proposition, which is the first recommendation concerning taxation of underwater 
petroleum reserves, the government focuses on attracting activity to the shelf, meaning that 
efficiency considerations were very important. This evaluation is based on the fact that taxes 
were set lower than usual and that it was considered to be more challenging to extract the oil 
in the Norwegian territories than in other parts of the North Sea. The Norwegian government 
had to have a taxation system that did not refrain the oil companies from investing in their 
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part of the North Sea. The proposition also shows that fiscal considerations were taken into 
account, since a production-based taxation gives the government revenue from the onset, 
since it is not dependent on the operations making a profit. The issue of transfer mispricing is 
not mentioned in this proposition, even though the regime is organized with a profit based 
taxation that makes it easy for the oil companies to evade Norwegian taxes. Since this was the 
first tax law for petroleum passed in Norway, one can argue that the officials wanted to make 
it as simple as possible both for the taxpayer and the tax collector. There might also have been 
a lack of information concerning transfer mispricing in this time period, which Hudson’s 
(2000) example from the 1960’s shows.  
Transfer mispricing considerations are not mentioned in this proposition. These 
considerations are therefore given a rank of 0 on the importance scale. Allocation, 
administrative and evasion considerations are not mentioned in the proposition. These 
considerations are given a rank of 0 on the importance scale.  Findings from this proposition 
indicate that efficiency considerations were the most important, and that fiscal considerations 
also had an impact. Since more than 50% of the pages (pp.1-3) in the proposition are about 
efficiency considerations these are given a rank of 3. Fiscal considerations are given a rank of 
1 on the importance scale, since less than 10% of the pages (p. 2) are about these 
considerations. Fiscal considerations are mentioned indirectly seeing as the production based 
taxation is implemented, which gives revenue to the state from the onset.  
Table 4.1 Ranking of considerations (1965) 
Fiscal 1 
Allocation 0 
Efficiency 3 
Evasion 0 
Administrative 0 
Transfer mispricing 0 
 
4.2 Securing profits – 1975  
The second case that is focused in this thesis is ot.prp. nr. 26 (1974-1975), Om lov om 
skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster m. v. This proposition is 60 pages in 
length, but the 20 last pages is an appendix, and this does not contain information about why 
the taxation regime is changed. In chapter six (pp. 28-30) the proposition addresses tax 
arrangements that are under evaluation, and is therefore not a part of my analysis. In chapter 
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nine (pp. 34-40) the new paragraphs are commented, but it does not provide any new 
arguments about changes in the regime. The main focus is therefore from page three to page 
28 and page 30 to page 32 (29 pages in total), since these pages contain the most essential 
information about the regime change in 1975. This means that if a consideration is mentioned 
in more than 2.9 pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the importance scale, since 2.9 pages is 
10% of 29 pages. If a consideration is evaluated in more than 14.5 pages it will be ranked as 
3, since 14.5 pages is 50% of 29 pages. Over 50% of these pages concern fiscal 
considerations. Transfer mispricing, evasion, administrative and efficiency considerations are 
covered in more than 10% of the pages. Allocation considerations are mentioned.  
In 1975 the Norwegian government made large changes to the taxation of petroleum. In 
Ot.prp. nr. 26 (1975), the Finance Ministry argued that the Norwegian government had to 
evaluate special measures in order to provide the Norwegian society with a larger portion of 
the proceeds, because the increase in the oil price since autumn 1973 had created a higher 
profit for the corporations operating on the Norwegian shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 3). 
The government also asserted that the state, through Statoil, should have a bigger role on the 
Norwegian shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 12). This suggests that fiscal considerations 
were important in 1975, since measures were taken to secure more of the profits.  
There is also a large focus on how the price for petroleum is set. At this time the host 
countries determined a fixed price for oil for tax purposes. This price was referred to as “the 
posted price”. From 1960-1970 it was set to $1.80 per barrel of Arabian light oil, even though 
the market price fell to $1.25 per barrel. During this decade the countries’ profits increased 
with about 10 cents per barrel. This changed in 1971, when the oil companies and a few of the 
host countries agreed to “the Teheran agreement”, which included stipulations saying that 
there were to be yearly increases in the posted price up to 1975. In February 1971 the price 
for Arabian light oil was set to $2.18. In another agreement signed in 1972 called “the Geneva 
agreement”, the posted price was to be adjusted every month and not every quarter, because 
of the devaluation of the dollar. Both these agreements conduced to regular increases in the 
posted price up until October 1973 (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 6).  
During the summer and fall of 1973 there was a shortage of crude oil on the world market, 
which made the difference between the world market price and the posted price set by the 
host countries smaller. There were attempts by the host countries at trying to negotiate the 
price with the oil companies, but without any results. The Gulf States in OPEC (Organization 
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of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) then announced that the posted price was to be 
increased with 70% ($5.12 for a barrel with Arabian light oil). The intention of this increase, 
according to the Gulf States, was to re-establish the ratio between the posted price and the 
world market price that existed when the Teheran agreement was signed. But the war in the 
Middle East (which broke out October 6th 1973) and the Arabian oil embargo resulted in an 
even higher price for crude oil, so OPEC once again increased the posted price to $11.65 in 
December 1973 (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 6). This shows that this was a tumultuous time 
in regards to pricing oil. Compared to the preceding decade, when there were only small 
fluctuations, the oil price went through enormous changes in a very small time period. The 
heavy focus on how the oil price was set, indicates that fiscal considerations and transfer 
mispricing might have been higher on the agenda than in the 1965 legislation. Because of the 
exceptional increase in the oil price the Norwegian government decided to introduce surtax. It 
is argued in the proposition that more of this additional income should go to the Norwegian 
society. After all, the income generated is from natural resources owned by the Norwegian 
state (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 21). This change suggests that fiscal considerations were 
important at this time, since the Norwegian government wanted to capture more of the profits.  
Efficiency and allocation consideration were evaluated before the surtax was implemented, 
because an additional tax could have had negative effects on both of these considerations. If 
the tax is set too high it could have refrained oil companies from investing in petroleum 
extraction on the Norwegian shelf, which is negative for efficiency considerations. An 
increase in the taxation could also affect the fair allocation of the profits between the 
Norwegian state and the oil companies. Measures were therefore taken to stimulate the oil 
companies to search for and extract oil. E.g. the revenues from less profitable fields were to 
be levied a lower tax than profitable fields (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 21). This can also be 
seen in connection with the clear statement that on the long term the Norwegian policy was to 
extract oil from fields that were marginally profitable, even though this would mean that the 
state’s income from the field would be small (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 12). But the 
proposition clearly express that fiscal considerations were the most important motivating 
factor for implementing the surtax: “A factor in this case is that this concerns profits from the 
exploitation of nature resources that are the Norwegian state’s property” (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-
1975, p. 21, own translation).   
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Up to this point in time the taxation of petroleum on the Norwegian shelf was built on the 
results displayed in the oil companies’ accounts (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 14); the tax 
authorities in Norway had to rely on the prices the oil companies had put down in their 
accounts, even when the transaction of raw oil was to a refinery owned by the same company. 
The risk that the oil company sets a lower price in this case is very high since it wants to 
maximize its profits. Also if the tax rates in Norway are higher than in other countries, this 
could tempt the multinational companies to transfer profits to parent or sister companies in 
other countries, and expenses from these companies to the Norwegian company to achieve a 
lowest possible tax rate (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 13). As a consequence of this, a norm 
price system was introduced by Lov om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster 
mv. [petroleumsskatteloven] in 1975. The proposition clearly states “The government has 
come to the decision that it is necessary with an administrative determination of the prices or 
values that should base the calculation of the companies profits when selling extracted 
petroleum” (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 4, own translation) and that “(…) the norm price is 
not implemented to provide the Norwegian state extra tax revenues with an artificially high 
price, but to solve the control and administrative concerns that would have arisen if the 
regime stayed the same” (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, pp. 15-16, own translation). Transfer 
mispricing and evasion considerations were clearly important issues in 1975. 
According to this law (§4), the norm price has to correspond to what petroleum could have 
been traded for between independent parts in a free market. With independent parts is meant 
buyers and sellers who mutually don’t have common interests that could have influenced an 
agreed upon price. At valuation the parts should consider inter alia achieved and noted prices 
for petroleum for the same or corresponding type with necessary adjustments for differences 
in quality, transportation costs etc. to the North Sea area or other current markets, delivery 
period, payment period and circumstances besides, achieved and noted prices for petroleum 
products with necessary adjustments for processing etc. and other comparable prices or 
valuations that exists. Whether the agreements are between associated companies or other 
agreements where special circumstances or remaining conditions had to have had influence 
for the pricing is to be considered. The norm price can be determined as a common price for 
petroleum that is extracted in a fixed term. The Ministry can determine closer guidelines that 
are to be followed in the pricing and can in each case decide that the determined norm price is 
not valid (Petroleumsskatteloven (1975), §4).  
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Before the norm price is determined, all the affected parts have to be notified and given the 
opportunity to comment based on rules set by the Ministry. If the pricing is handed over to a 
subordinate agency, each part has a right to demand that the Ministry reviews the determined 
price. In connection with this kind of review the parts can demand that the pricing is 
submitted to a committee of experts so that they can give a statement about the pricing if it is 
obviously unreasonable before the Ministry approves the pricing (Petroleumsskatteloven 
(1975), §4). The norm price for petroleum was to be set quarterly (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, 
p. 16). Furthermore, the Public Administration Act is valid when treating cases after this 
paragraph. The Ministry determines closer stipulations about the administrative procedures 
and appointing the expert committee, and during which can do necessary exceptions from the 
Public Administration Act’s ordinary stipulations (Petroleumsskatteloven (1975), §4). 
The proposition states, “The implementation of the norm price system entails, as mentioned, 
large administrative advantages” (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 15, own translation). Because 
the Norwegian officials also evaluated other alternatives to deal with the problem of transfer 
mispricing. E.g. that they could inspect every transaction between the companies operating on 
the shelf, but the norm price system is argued to be a much easier system than if the tax 
authorities for each transaction had to evaluate if there was a common interest, and if the price 
was affected by this relationship (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 13). This shows that the norm 
price system would have positive effects on the administrative part of setting the price for oil, 
because the other alternative would have demanded too much of the Norwegian tax 
authorities.  
The possibilities of transferring deficits to the Norwegian shelf, so that the deficits could have 
been deduced in future profits, are minimized in the proposition. This is done to ensure that 
the government can have sufficient control with the use of the petroleum profits in Norway 
(Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 20). It was also important that the system is not too complicated 
and labour-intensive. This is especially important for a small country like Norway that cannot 
compete with the staff of experts the multinational companies have on this area (Ot.prp. nr. 
26, 1974-1975, p. 13). Since this in an evasive strategy from the oil companies, these rules 
indicate that evasion considerations were important.  
There are several depreciation rules in the legislation from 1975. E.g. deficits in the first years 
of production will be deduced in future profits (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, p. 19-20). These 
rules are positive for the oil companies, because they can operate on the shelf even with a 
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deficit. Petroleum extraction is an industry that requires a lot of patience from both companies 
and host countries. Depreciation arrangements from the host country provide the extractor 
with additional incentives to continue searching for and extracting oil, and they secure an 
efficient use of the resource. This indicates that efficiency considerations were important at 
this time.  
All in all there were two major changes in the proposition from 1975: the Ministry 
implemented a surtax and constructed the norm price system. Fiscal considerations were the 
most important motivating factor for implementing the surtax, which is stated in the 
discussion concerning other considerations:  
(…) firstly the desire of securing the Norwegian state a reasonable part of 
the profits from petroleum extraction on the long term. Secondly the 
desire that the increases in the states tax incomes should come fairly soon. 
And thirdly the desire of creating tax arrangements that is clear and easy 
to administer. The proposition that is laid forward shows signs that the two 
last elements after an overall evaluation has had to stand back (Ot.prp. nr. 
26, 1974-1975, p. 21, own translation).  
The second major change was the implementation of the norm price system. It was 
implemented because of the administrative and control concerns that would have arisen if the 
regime stayed the same (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, pp. 15-16). This indicates that transfer 
mispricing, evasion and administrative considerations were the motivating factors for 
introducing norm prices. Allocation considerations are mentioned, but changes were not made 
because of these considerations. The government introduced depreciation rules in order to 
increase efficiency on the shelf.  
Allocation considerations are given a rank of 1, since these are mentioned on page 19 in 
connection with the implementation of the surtax. Efficiency considerations are given a rank 
of 2. These were addressed on page 19-20 and page 32. The implementation of the norm price 
system is addressed on page 14-19, which is more than 10%, but less than 50% of the pages in 
this proposition. This system was introduced to solve control and administrative concerns that 
existed in the former regime in connection with transfer mispricing. This means that 
administrative, evasion and transfer mispricing considerations are given a rank of 2. Fiscal 
considerations are covered in more than 50% of this proposition, and are the most important 
consideration. These considerations are addressed from page five to page 13 in connection 
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with the dramatic price increases in this time period, and in the discussion about the surtax on 
page 19 to page 23. Hence I have ranked this consideration as a 3 on the importance scale.  
Table 4.2 Ranking of considerations (1975) 
Fiscal 3 
Allocation 1 
Efficiency 2 
Evasion 2 
Administrative 2 
Transfer mispricing 2 
 
4.3 Additional sharpening of the petroleum tax – 1980  
The third case that is focused in this thesis is ot.prp. nr. 37 (1979-1980), Om lov om endring i 
lov av 13. juni 1975 nr. 35 om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster m.v. This 
proposition is 61 pages in length, but the last 8 pages is an appendix, and do not contain 
information about why the taxation regime is changed. A section of chapter 5 (pp. 31-35) 
addresses tax arrangements that are under evaluation, and is not a part of my analysis. In 
chapter nine (pp. 48-53) the proposition comment on the paragraphs in the petroleum 
taxation, but it does not provide any new arguments about changes to the regime. The main 
focus is therefore from page three to page 31 and page 35 to page 47, since these pages 
contain this information. In total there are 42 pages that are analysed. This means that if a 
consideration is mentioned in more than 4.2 pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the 
importance scale, since 4.2 pages is 10% of 42 pages. If a consideration is evaluated in more 
than 21 pages it will be ranked as 3, since 21 pages is 50% of 42 pages. None of the 
considerations are addressed in more than 50% of the pages. More than 10%, but less than 
50% of the pages concern fiscal considerations. Efficiency, administrative, transfer 
mispricing, evasion and allocation considerations are mentioned.  
The legislation from 1975 was changed in 1980 and, just like in 1975, many of the changes 
were made because of the sudden rise in the oil price. Tax rules often reflect the current price 
situation and prospects at a certain time. This seems also to be true for the petroleum industry, 
since the taxation system went through changes both in 1975 and 1980 because of an increase 
in the oil price (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 3). 
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OPEC had a very dominant role when it came to setting the price for oil in this time period, 
and this also affected the price of oil from the North Sea-area. In 1975 the price of Arabian 
light oil, which was the reference oil for OPECs price setting, was set to $10.50 per barrel, 
increasing to $11.50 at the end of that year. From January 1977 to the turn of the year 1978-
1979 the reference oil price was set to $12.70. There were only minor increases in the price of 
Arabian light, and the oil price was quite stable in this period. This situation changed during 
the fall of 1978, when there was a tightening in the market for crude oil. Several 
developments triggered this rise. E.g. the revolution in Iran in the winter of 1978-1979, forced 
the country to reduce its production of crude oil from 5.5 million barrels per day in September 
1978 to 2.4 million barrels in December 1978, and to below one million barrels per day in 
January and February 1979. Since Iran had to reduce its production with about 4.5 million 
barrels per day, and the winter in Europe and North America was very cold, it lead to a 
shortage in the supply of oil. The demand was then especially turned to the type of oil that 
was extracted in the North Sea and North Africa, which both are lighter petroleum qualities 
with low levels of sulphur (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, pp. 10-11).  
A few countries in OPEC increased their production to compensate for the lower production 
in Iran. Saudi Arabia temporarily increased their production limit from 8.5 million barrels per 
day to 9.5 million barrels per day. Production also increased in Iraq, Kuwait and Nigeria, but 
the pressure in the oil market continued. The shortage of crude oil therefore conduced OPEC 
to increase the reference oil price. The price was first raised to $13.34 from January 1st 1979, 
and was to be increased gradually to $14.54 in the fourth quarter of 1979. But this price was 
set already in April 1979, much sooner than first intended. At the OPEC price meeting in June 
1979 the price was yet again increased. The reference price for petroleum was then set to $18, 
with an upper limit of $23.50 for the most valuable qualities, but this limit was breached in 
October when several OPEC countries set a price of $26.27 for these types of oil. This 
development in the price continued throughout 1979, with many OPEC countries deciding to 
break with the prices set by OPEC and set their own price for oil. Most of the member states 
from the Middle East increased their prices to $26 at the end of 1979. This shows that the oil 
price went through several increases, and e.g. Saudi Arabia increased the price of crude oil 
with 105% from December 1978 to December 1979 (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 11). The 
value of Norwegian petroleum was largely based on prices on similar crude oils from the 
OPEC countries, so the same development was found in the Norwegian norm price. In the 
fourth quarter of 1978 the norm price was set to $14.29 per barrel. It increased to $27.50 in 
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the fourth quarter of 1979. So in a year it had almost doubled (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 
15). 
If the Norwegian taxation system had not changed, the oil companies would have been 
granted very high revenues because of the high oil price. This is also the reason why the tax 
law from 1975 was changed in 1980 (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 35). The Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy made a prognosis over the six next years (1980-1985) that depicted 
how much more the government would earn if the new taxation system were implemented 
compared to if it stayed unchanged. Operating with a petroleum price of $33 per barrel and a 
nominal price increase for petroleum of 10% per year, the prognosis showed that the 
Norwegian state’s profits would increase with 12.3% and the oil companies’ profits would 
decrease with 32.5% (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 37). In particular the officials decided to 
raise the surtax. It had remained unchanged since its implementation in 1975, when it was set 
to 25%. So in 1980 it was raised to 35% (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 30). It was necessary 
for the government to take care of Norwegian interests by sharpening the taxation of 
petroleum on the Norwegian shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 35), and thereby securing 
more of the profits. This indicates that fiscal considerations were important in 1980. It seems 
like the oil price in the world market clearly affects when changes are made in the Norwegian 
taxation system. 
The increased surtax could have had implications for efficiency considerations. When the 
total tax on petroleum increases it could have refrained the oil companies from investing in 
fields that were profitable under the initial taxation system. Because under the new regime 
with increased taxes, the fields would no longer be commercially exploitable. This is 
addressed in the proposition, but the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of 
Finance did not think that a tax increase would affect the development on the Norwegian shelf 
(Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 41). They base this evaluation on the fact that the increased oil 
price would also improve the oil companies’ profitability of developing new fields: 
The two Ministries are aware that the new tax proposals will reduce the 
profitability of developing new fields. On the other hand the increase in 
the real price for petroleum from 1978 to 1980 has to a great extent 
improved the profitability of developing new fields. The cost estimations 
the companies now can do after the new tax rules, might seem more 
favourable than cost estimations made in 1978, and party in 1979, based 
on the old tax rules (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 5, own translation). 
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Transfer mispricing is mentioned, since the norm price system is evaluated. In particular the 
petroleum price council wanted the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of 
Finance to consider a change in the legislation text, so that there would be no doubts about 
how the legislation is to be understood. But no changes were made in this question because 
the two Ministries believed that the original legislation provided clear guidelines for the oil 
companies (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 24). All in all there were not made any changes to 
the norm price system since the Ministries considered “(…) the current set of rules about 
norm prices will still fill its function in the determination of a correct and appropriate basis for 
the taxation” (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 25, own translation). But some issues were 
addressed. E.g. the development preceding the proposition was that the amount of oil in the 
world trade that was sold between unrelated international oil companies had been decreasing. 
This could have made it challenging to set a correct price, since price information in this part 
of the market had become less comprehensive and less representative, but steps were not 
taken to improve this situation (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 25). The proposition also notes 
“The tax assessing of large oil corporations is a very extensive task. It regularly concerns 
multinational corporations that are assisted by experts on all relevant areas like law, economy, 
accounting etc.” (Ot.prp. nr. 37, 1979-1980, p. 45, own translation).  
Transfer mispricing considerations are given a rank of 1 on the importance scale, since these 
are only mentioned on page 24 to page 25. Efficiency considerations are mentioned in the 
discussion concerning the increased surtax on page 41, and given a rank of 1. Evasion 
considerations are mentioned on page 21 and page 22 in connection with the distribution of 
profits and expenses between the shelf and the municipality. Administrative considerations 
are discussed on page 44 to page 46. More specifically this discussion concern how difficult it 
is to tax large oil companies with their considerable expertise on areas like economy and law, 
and that the oil tax office should be allowed to hire experts on these areas. Fiscal 
considerations are the most important considerations in this proposition. These considerations 
are addressed in more than 10%, but less than 50% of the pages, and are hence ranked as 2 on 
the importance scale. As in 1975 fiscal considerations are discussed on page 9 to page 13 in 
connection with the price increase in this time period, and on page 30 concerning the surtax 
rate. None of the considerations are ranked as 3. 
Table 4.3 Ranking of considerations (1980) 
Fiscal 2 
Allocation 1 
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Efficiency 1 
Evasion 1 
Administrative 1 
Transfer mispricing 1 
 
4.4 Inciting to more activity on the shelf – 1986  
The fourth case that is focused in this thesis is ot.prp. nr. 3 (1986-1987), Om lov om endring i 
lov av 13. juni 1975 nr. 35 om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster m.v. This 
proposition is 35 pages in length. My analysis is focused on page three to page 20 and page 
24 to page 33, since chapter six (pp. 21-23) discusses tax arrangements that are under 
evaluation and the two last pages contain the same information as the preceding pages. In 
total there are 28 pages that are analysed. This means that if a consideration is mentioned in 
more than 2.8 pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the importance scale, since 2.8 pages is 
10% of 28 pages. If a consideration is evaluated in more than 14 pages it will be ranked as 3, 
since 14 pages is 50% of 28 pages. None of the considerations are addressed in more than 
50% of the pages, but more than 10% of the pages concerns efficiency considerations. 
Transfer mispricing and administrative considerations are mentioned in the proposition. 
Fiscal, allocation and evasion considerations are not evaluated.  
Efficiency considerations were important in 1986, and changes to the taxation system were 
once again provoked by the world market price for oil. From 1980 to 1985 the oil price was 
decreasing insignificantly, but in the first quarter of 1986 it decreased dramatically from 
$27.5 to $9 (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 4). There are several factors that lead to this 
decrease, but one explanation is that the high price level at the end of the 1970s contributed to 
a more effective extraction of oil, and also increased development of other energy sources. In 
addition to this the demand for oil outside state-trading countries decreased with 13%, and 
oil’s part of the total energy consumption fell from 52% to 45%. This development increased 
the uncertainty about the future price expectations (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 8) and made 
the Norwegian government reconsider its taxation system (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 11). 
 The officials did not think that the production on the Norwegian shelf would be affected by 
the price decrease in the short term, but if the oil companies expected the oil price to rise they 
could have found it more profitable to delay the extraction. This would have had negative 
effects on efficiency considerations. Even more concerning for efficiency was the fact that 
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low oil prices could have influenced the oil companies’ decisions to close down fields early. 
Because as production on a field decreases, the operating costs per barrel of oil produced will 
increase. The oil companies are then forced to close down production prematurely when the 
oil price is low. Furthermore the price decrease could have refrained the oil companies from 
investing in new fields on the shelf. The taxation system therefore had to be tailored in a way 
that kept the oil companies’ future investments up. This is specifically stated in the 
proposition: “The future expansion level will then in a large degree be dependent on the new 
framework conditions the companies are offered in the form of changed taxation rules” 
(Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 11 own translation).  
The Norwegian government implemented many changes that were supposed to make it more 
beneficial to invest on the shelf. E.g. the depreciation rules were changed, so that depreciation 
could start in the first year of investment. In the former regime this was not possible until the 
field was in production, and this weakened the profitability for new projects after tax. This 
change was therefore made because of efficiency considerations (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 
15). The government also implemented a production remuneration based on the gross value 
for new petroleum production (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 16).   
The non-taxable income was removed for investments after January 1st 1987. This change was 
made in connection with the new depreciation rules, because when depreciation could start in 
the first year the non-taxable income would have counteracted the governments desire to 
encourage increased cost consciousness from the oil companies’ side. This implies that this 
change was made because of efficiency considerations. In addition to this the non-taxable 
income had been a very labour-intensive element for the tax authorities. By removing it, the 
government made the taxation system easier, which also indicate that administrative 
considerations were important when the non-taxable income was removed (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 
1986-1987, p. 15-16). 
Preceding this proposition, the foreign oil companies had to support the state’s economic risk 
in the searching phase. This entailed that all the other companies’ costs were doubled in the 
searching phase compared to the size of their share. This arrangement was changed, so that 
the state had to support its own economic risk in the searching phase in the future. The 
motivation for this change was that the oil companies would apply for field participation if 
this arrangement were changed. The former design had a negative effect for the companies 
when they evaluated if they were to participate on a field or not. “When a company evaluates 
 33 
if it is to apply for participation on a block or not, the supporting commitment would have a 
negative effect on the decision” (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, p. 18, own translation). 
Calculations made by the Ministries showed that if the oil companies did not have to support 
the state’s economic risk, they would reduce their costs in the four-year period between 1987-
1990 with 1.3 billion NOK and 1.9 billion NOK based on an oil price of about $13 and $18 
per barrel (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, pp. 18-19). “The abolishing of the support arrangement 
for the foreign oil companies might reduce this distortion in the current system” (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 
1986-1987, p. 19, own translation). This means that this change also was made because of 
efficiency considerations.  
The production-based taxation was a part of the initial tax legislation from 1965, and had over 
the years been changed a few times. In 1965 it was set to 10%, but for extraction permits after 
1972 it varied between 8-16% depending on the how much was produced on each field. It was 
calculated on the basis of the value of extracted petroleum on the extraction areas ship off 
point. The production-based taxation could have made projects that were socially profitable, 
unprofitable for the oil companies after tax. Since the Norwegian government wanted to 
improve the framework conditions, the production-based taxation was set to zero for new 
fields (Ot.prp. nr. 3, 1986-1987, pp. 19-20). This indicates that efficiency considerations were 
important when officials set the production-based taxation to zero.   
Allocation, evasion and fiscal considerations are not mentioned, giving them a rank of 0. 
Administrative considerations are evaluated on page 15 and 16, but this is not more than 10% 
of the pages. Transfer mispricing considerations are addressed on page 12, but the officials 
did not make any changes in the current system. Transfer mispricing and administrative 
considerations are therefore given a rank of 1. This proposition’s most important 
consideration was efficiency considerations. All changes were made so that the oil companies 
would continue to invest in the field. The government wanted to compensate for the low oil 
price. But efficiency considerations are not addressed in more than 50% of the pages, and are 
not given a rank of 3. They are discussed on page four and five in connection with the 
depreciation rules, on page 11 about the future activity level on the Norwegian shelf, and on 
page 15-16 about the non-taxable income.  Efficiency considerations were evaluated on more 
than 2.8 pages, and hence these considerations are ranked as 2 on the importance scale. But it 
is important to note that without the changes that were made in this proposition the fiscal 
terms may have been weakened in the long term, since the state would have lost a lot of 
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money if the oil companies closed down fields early or decided to not extract oil on the 
Norwegian shelf.  
Table 4.4 Ranking of considerations (1986) 
Fiscal 0 
Allocation 0 
Efficiency 2 
Evasion 0 
Administrative 1 
Transfer mispricing 1 
 
4.5 The petroleum tax reform – 1992  
The fifth case that is focused in this thesis is ot.prp. nr. 12 (1991-1992), Om lov om endring i 
lov av 13. juni 1975 nr. 35 om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster m.v. This 
proposition is 58 pages in length. Part three (pp. 51-53) of the proposition is not analysed, 
since these pages discuss tax questions that are under evaluation. In part four (pp. 54-58) the 
proposition notes on the wording of the tax law. These pages include much of the same 
information as the preceding pages, and are not a part of my analysis. My main focus is 
turned to page five to page 50. In total there are 46 pages that are analysed. This means that if 
a consideration is mentioned in more than 4.6 pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the 
importance scale, since 4.6 pages is 10% of 46 pages. If a consideration is evaluated in more 
than 23 pages it will be ranked as 3, since 23 pages is 50% of 46 pages. None of the 
considerations are evaluated in more than 50% of the pages. Efficiency considerations are 
addressed in less than 50%, but more than 10% of the proposition. Transfer mispricing, fiscal, 
allocation and administrative considerations are mentioned, but not addressed in more than 
10% of the proposition pages. Evasion considerations are not mentioned. 
In 1992 the Norwegian shelf had grown to be more competitive on the international scene 
than earlier, both in regard to searching for new fields and development of existing fields. 
There was more interest for new licences, there were a lot of fields under planning (Ot.prp. nr. 
12, 1991-1992, p. 16) and new fields were also under development (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-
1992, p. 11). “Compared to most areas in the world that are open for search activity, the 
Norwegian shelf stand as an attractive area” (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 15, own 
translation). The Ministry evaluated in this proposition “(…) how one can achieve more exact 
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investment incentives and improve the use of resources with a reform of the petroleum 
taxation” (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 6, own translation). 
The taxation of petroleum is based on the ordinary corporate taxation, and in 1992 this law 
went through a reform. Changes made in this reform had negative effects on revenues from 
the petroleum sector, and that is why changes had to be made to the petroleum tax law. The 
most drastic change that was made in the ordinary taxation for corporations was that the tax 
rate on the companies’ profits was reduced from 50.8% to 28% (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 
5), but this was not necessary for the petroleum taxation. The Ministry therefore proposed that 
the surtax rate was to be set to 50% for petroleum (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 26). It is not 
clearly stated in the proposition that the surtax is held at 50% because of fiscal considerations, 
but the government would have lost a lot of the revenue if the surtax had been decreased to 
28%. This indicates that fiscal considerations had an impact on the government’s decision to 
hold the surtax rate at 50%.  
In 1986 the government had introduced a production remuneration, but in 1992 it was 
removed. Initially this remuneration was introduced so that oil companies would find it 
interesting to invest in the oil extraction on the Norwegian shelf. But this part of the taxation 
system created differences in the tax-related treatment of the different fields on the shelf, 
which is negative for the efficient extraction of oil from the shelf since some fields are treated 
as more profitable than other fields. Furthermore this remuneration could have given large 
problems for the tax assessment authorities, especially in connection with the different forms 
of contracts with regards to borrowing and lending of gas. This question concerns the basis of 
calculation. The production remuneration was therefore removed because of administrative 
considerations and partly also because of efficiency considerations (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, 
p. 21).  
In 1986 the government removed the non-taxable income, but in 1992 it was reintroduced. 
Since the production remuneration was to be removed many companies wanted the 
government to maintain some protection of their income against surtax by other 
arrangements, and the Ministry argued that this best was achieved by introducing the non-
taxable income. Technically the Ministry suggested that 5% of the cost price for operating 
assets that are depreciated, was to be deduced in the surtax base for six years from the year 
the operating asset started depreciation (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 22). This could provide 
the oil companies with an extra incentive to invest on the Norwegian shelf and could also 
 36 
attract new activity. The reintroduction of the non-taxable income therefore indicates that 
efficiency considerations were important.  
One of the reasons why the non-taxable income was removed in 1986 was that it made the 
taxation system more difficult. This is also addressed in the proposition from 1992, but the 
Ministry argues that since the rules for transferring and distributing the non-taxable income 
between owners and users of pipelines were abolished in 1986, the effects on administrative 
considerations would no longer be as negative as before (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 22). 
This makes sense, since the tax authorities would have fewer rules to follow when they 
calculated the non-taxable income.   
Changes made to the production-based taxation and the arrangement where foreign oil 
companies had to support the state’s economic risk in the searching phase in 1986 are also 
addressed in this proposition. The officials use the same arguments in this proposition as they 
did in 1986: that the production-based taxation has a negative effect on decisions to close 
down fields, which could have led to fields being closed down prematurely, and that the 
production-based taxation should still be set to zero. Supporting the state’s costs in the 
searching phase created an unnecessary unequal treatment of the corporations operating on 
the shelf, since foreign oil companies had much higher costs than the national oil companies 
because they had to support the state’s costs. Both these arrangements are therefore upheld in 
this proposition, but the officials decided that oil companies operating on permits given before 
1987 also should not need to support the state’s costs in the searching phase (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 
1991-1992, pp. 27-28). As in 1986 these arguments indicate that efficiency considerations 
were important. This is also stated in the proposition: “These changes entail that one gets a 
taxation system that is more neutral, i.e. it affects the companies’ economic disposals to a 
lesser degree” (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 33, own translation) and “The Ministry means 
that the consideration to an efficient extraction of oil and gas resources is best taken care of in 
a taxation system where profitability after and before tax corresponds” (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-
1992, p. 33, own translation).   
The norm price system is mentioned in the proposition, but there is only a general description 
of how the system works (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-1992, p. 41). The Ministry notes that:  
Norm price regulated sales raises relatively few questions, but there have 
been registered problems in connection with deals about increased credit 
period, costs that are not assumed to be deducted in the norm price 
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decision and quality compensation for compound oil (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1991-
1992, p. 41).  
But there was not made any changes to the current solution. Since transfer mispricing 
considerations are only mentioned in the proposition they are given a rank of 1 on the 
importance scale.   
The most important consideration in this proposition is efficiency considerations. The 
government wanted to improve efficiency for the oil companies, by making it more attractive 
to invest on the Norwegian shelf. Removing the production-based taxation did this. This is 
discussed on page 27. The foreign oil companies and national oil companies would operate on 
more equal terms, since the arrangement where the foreign oil companies had to support the 
state’s costs in the searching phase was removed, and made it more attractive to invest on the 
Norwegian shelf. This is discussed on page 21-22, page 28 and on page 33. Efficiency 
considerations are addressed in less than 50% of the proposition pages, and are ranked as 2 on 
the importance scale. Administrative considerations are also evaluated in the proposition; the 
production remuneration was removed partly because it was a very complex arrangement to 
handle for the tax officials. Administrative considerations are given a rank of 1 on the 
importance scale, since these are only mentioned on page 21. Fiscal considerations are not 
directly mentioned in the proposition, but if the surtax had decreased to 28% the government 
would have lost a lot of revenue from the petroleum sector. The decision to hold the surtax 
rate at 50% therefor indicates that fiscal considerations had an impact. Fiscal considerations 
are given a rank of 1 on the importance scale. Evasion and allocation considerations are not 
mentioned in this proposition, and are given a rank of 0 on the importance scale.   
Table 4.5 Ranking of considerations (1992) 
Fiscal 1 
Allocation 0 
Efficiency 2 
Evasion 0 
Administrative 1 
Transfer mispricing 1 
 
4.6 A neutral petroleum taxation – 2000  
The sixth case that is focused in this thesis is ot.prp. nr. 86 (2000-2001), Om lov om endringer 
i lov 13. juni 1975 nr. 35 om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster mv. 
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(petroleumsskatteloven). This proposition is 46 pages in length, but my main focus is from 
page five to page 46. In total there are 42 pages that are analysed. This means that if a 
consideration is mentioned in more than 4.2 pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the 
importance scale, since 4.2 pages is 10% of 42 pages. If a consideration is evaluated in more 
than 21 pages it will be ranked as 3, since 21 pages is 50% of 42 pages. Evasion 
considerations are discussed in more than 50% of the proposition. Fiscal, efficiency and 
administrative considerations are mentioned. Transfer mispricing and allocation 
considerations are not mentioned in this proposition.  
In October 1999 the Ministry of Finance sat down a committee that evaluated the petroleum 
taxation. This committee delivered their findings in NOU 2000:18 Skattlegging av 
petroleumsvirksomhet, where they pointed to several weaknesses in the current taxation 
system for petroleum. It is based on their recommendations that the regime went through 
many changes in 2000. Two important objectives with these changes was to prevent the oil 
companies from undertaking activity on the shelf that was not socially profitable (Ot.prp. nr. 
86, 2000-2001, p. 20), and that the oil companies could operate on more equal terms on the 
Norwegian shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 40). But it is important to point out that the 
solutions to transfer mispricing, the norm price system, was not evaluated by this committee 
(NOU 2000:18, p. 8). 
One change that was made in this proposition was that the allocation rule concerning financial 
posts was changed. In the former regime the companies that were active in both Norway and 
in another country, could spread their debt interests between the two tax districts. That is 
income from extraction on the Norwegian shelf and the extraction companies’ income from 
other activity. This allocation rule led the companies to allocate the debt interests to the shelf 
tax district. This was done because the payoff before tax on the shelf was much higher than in 
other activity, and the income from other activity was low because the subsidiary company 
rarely returned profits to the shelf company. The debt interest could then be subtracted based 
on a tax rate of 78% instead of 28% in the tax regime on land. This rule meant that the shelf 
company had lower financial costs than other companies on activity outside the shelf. 
Companies could then be tempted by tax motives to place other activity to the shelf company 
(Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 6). The proposition notes,  
The unequal division of financial costs undermine the tax base on the 
shelf. The rule leads the shelf company to have lower costs than other 
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companies with activity outside the shelf. The allocation rule gives strong 
tax motives to place other activity into the shelf company. The financing 
advantage is a tax related subsidy that gives the shelf companies a definite 
advantage compared to the competition. The allocation rule makes it 
possible to undertake investments, establishments or purchases that are 
corporately profitable, but not socio-economic (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, 
p. 23, own translation). 
The difference between taxation levels in the land tax regime and the tax regime on the shelf 
made it very important where an income or expense was deducted. Furthermore the shelf 
companies’ foreign activities had increased over the years, and many of them had placed 
activity that was not related to the Norwegian shelf in the Norwegian extraction company 
(Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 24-25). In addition to this the former allocation rule made 
investments corporately profitable, but these were not socially profitable (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 
2000-2001, p. 23). The new rule entailed that an extraction company’s overall financial costs 
were to be allocated between the land tax district and the shelf tax district, based on the value 
of the tax related depreciation in the two tax districts (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 6). This 
indicates that evasion considerations were important motivating factors for this change, since 
the government wanted more control over where the oil companies had their activity and if 
this activity was related to operations on the Norwegian shelf.  
The new rule meant additional work for the tax administrators in the government and in the 
oil companies. The governments tax administrators had to control if the information given by 
the oil companies was correct, and tax administrators in the oil companies were required to 
provide documentation about where funds were allocated (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 44). 
This meant that administrative considerations were devalued in this proposal, in the sense that 
the workload increased for both the state tax officials and tax experts in the oil companies. It 
was more important for the government that the oil companies operated on equal terms, and 
that new oil companies could be attracted to apply for licenses on the Norwegian shelf.  
When a company evaluated if it was to apply for licenses on the Norwegian shelf it was 
important for the state to consider how long it would take before the company could be taxed 
and deduct its expenses. This meant that the companies that already had a taxable income had 
an advantage, and new companies could then have refrained from applying for licenses. The 
Ministry therefore permitted companies to carry their losses forward, and thereby place the 
companies on equal terms. This change was implemented to get new actors on the Norwegian 
shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 6). With more companies competing for licences the state 
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was improving efficiency on the shelf, and also increasing the government’s revenue. This 
indicates that efficiency considerations were a motivating factor for this change. In the former 
system the government had fewer companies to choose from, but with more companies 
competing for the same licenses the revenue from the shelf to the government could have 
increased, since the government most likely would pick the oil company that gave the most of 
the profit to the state. This indicates that fiscal considerations also were important in this 
change.  
In the former regime the companies could deduct 50% of their deficits on the income from the 
shelf. This opportunity was removed because the government wanted to protect the petroleum 
taxation (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, p. 6). Furthermore the Ministry implemented a limitation 
in the opportunity to activate interest expenses as a cost price for the operating asset that is 
deducted after §3b in the petroleum tax law. The government wanted a more coherent set of 
rules, so the allocation of financial posts between shelf and land were to happen before the 
interest was activated (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 2000-2001, pp. 6-7). 
Transfer mispricing is not mentioned in this proposition. Hence I have ranked this 
consideration as a 0 on the importance scale. Allocation considerations are not mentioned in 
this proposition and are therefore given a ranking of 0. Since efficiency, administrative and 
fiscal considerations are mentioned in the proposition these considerations are given a ranking 
of 1. Efficiency and fiscal considerations are mentioned on page 6. Administrative 
considerations are mentioned on page 44, in connection with what consequences the new 
rules about allocation of financial posts would have for the tax officials. The most important 
consideration in this proposition was evasion considerations. This evaluation is based on the 
fact that one of the changes were made to prevent the oil companies from allocating activity 
to the Norwegian shelf that was not tax deductible on the shelf, which is discussed from page 
six to page eight, page 14 to 16 and page 23 to page 37. Evasion considerations are addressed 
in more than 50% of the proposition and are ranked as 3 on the importance scale. 
Table 4.6 Ranking of considerations (2000) 
Fiscal 1 
Allocation 0 
Efficiency 1 
Evasion 3 
Administrative 1 
Transfer mispricing 0 
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4.7 Determining the price of natural gas – 2010  
The seventh case that is focused in this thesis is prop. 126 LS (2009-2010), Endringar i 
skatte- og avgiftsreglane. This proposition is 64 pages in length, but it addresses several 
changes to the taxation in general. Only one of the chapters contains information about 
changes to the petroleum taxation. The main focus is therefore from page 26 to page 36, since 
these pages contain this information. In total there are 11 pages that are analysed. This means 
that if a consideration is mentioned in more than 1.1 pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the 
importance scale, since 1.1 pages is 10% of 11 pages. If a consideration is evaluated in more 
than 5.5 pages it will be ranked as 3, since 5.5 pages is 50% of 11 pages. More than 50% of 
the pages in this proposition address transfer mispricing considerations. Fiscal, efficiency, 
administrative and evasion considerations are mentioned, but in less than 10% of the pages. 
Allocation considerations are not mentioned in this proposition.  
 “Gassforhandlingsutvalget” (the gas negotiation committee) had up until 2002 taken care of 
all sales of dry gas from the Norwegian shelf. The committee negotiated long term and neutral 
contracts, which then had to be approved by the Norwegian government. This arrangement 
created a clear demarcation between sellers and buyers of gas. The prices could therefore be 
used in the taxation of the companies. After 2002 the companies were themselves responsible 
for selling self-produced gas. This meant that the companies could sell to a subsidiary 
company, and set a price internally. This new situation therefore opened up the opportunity 
for transfer mispricing of natural gas. The oil companies had strong incentives to transfer 
most of the income from the Norwegian shelf to other parts of the company that were levied 
lower taxes, since there was a tax rate of 78% in the petroleum sector at this time (Prop. 126 
LS, 2009-2010, pp. 26-27). This strong focus on this issue in the proposition indicates that 
transfer mispricing considerations were important.  
The market for gas had grown over time, and companies that were liable to pay surtax in 2008 
had gross revenues for dry gas and liquid natural gas of about 163 billion NOK, where 62 
billion NOK were sales between subsidiaries. Here it is also interesting to note that after the 
oil companies were allowed to sell gas for themselves, internal sales increased from 4.2 
billion NOK in 2002 to 61.8 billion NOK in 2008 (Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010, p. 28). Natural 
gas was usually sold in large quanta, so that only small discrepancies from the market price 
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could have had large effects on tax incomes to the Norwegian state (Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010, 
p. 28).  
The oil companies were already instructed to give information about selling and buying oil to 
subsidiaries. They had a so-called filling requirement, meaning that the companies had to 
deliver a document that explained what kind of transactions there were between subsidiaries 
and the volume of these transactions. The Ministry believed that this arrangement did not 
provide the necessary guaranty to systematically collect the relevant market information that 
was needed for a tax control, since only sales between subsidiaries had to be documented to 
the government. The Ministry argued that sales between independent parties also had to be 
documented. Because if the government had information about pricing arrangements between 
subsidiaries and independent parties they could compare them, and this could refrain 
companies from selling gas at a lower price to subsidiaries, since the government had the 
opportunity to check if the price varied a lot between sales to subsidiaries and sales to 
independent parties (Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010, pp. 28-29). The Ministry states that:  
“Comparisons of prices and terms in transactions between independent 
parties and between subsidiaries is an important element in the evaluation 
of the conditions to adjust the income based on discretion are fulfilled and 
to determine the arm’s length price for subsidiaries (…)” (Prop. 126 LS, 
2009-2010, p. 30, own translation). 
In order for the tax authorities to have enough knowledge on the sales, the companies were 
required to provide a lot of information and these reports had to be delivered every quarter. 
Specifically they had to report whom the contract was between, when the arrangement was 
signed, the quantity of gas and how the price is set etc. If the companies did not deliver this 
report they were subject to a fine (Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010, p. 34).  
Changes made to petroleum taxation in this proposition indicate that transfer mispricing 
considerations were very important at this time. Since the system for selling gas had changed 
a lot over the years, the government felt that the current arrangement was not good enough. 
Transfer mispricing considerations are addressed in more than 50% of the proposition pages. 
All the analysed pages in this proposition concerns transfer mispricing considerations. Hence 
this consideration is given a rank of 3. Since the Norwegian state could potentially have lost a 
lot of revenue if they had not implemented changes to this part of the system, fiscal 
consideration also had an impact. In this regard the Ministry notes “If tax motivated internal 
pricing happens, the proposition will conduce to increased tax income from the extraction 
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companies” (Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010, p. 35). Fiscal considerations are given a rank of 1 on 
the importance scale, since it is evaluated in less than 10% of the proposition pages. 
Administrative considerations and efficiency considerations are mentioned in the proposition. 
All of these are given a rank of 1. Allocation considerations are given a rank of 0 on the 
importance scale since these considerations are not mentioned.  
Table 4.7 Ranking of considerations (2010) 
Fiscal 1 
Allocation 0 
Efficiency 1 
Evasion 1 
Administrative 1 
Transfer mispricing 3 
 
4.8 The current regime – 2013  
The eighth and last case that is focused in this thesis is prop. 150 LS (2012-2013), Endringar i 
skatte-, avgifts- og tollovgivninga. This proposition is 70 pages in length, but only one of the 
chapters contains information about changes to the petroleum taxation. The remaining 
chapters address changes to the taxation in general. The main focus is therefore from page 10 
to page 16, since these pages contain information about the petroleum taxation. In total there 
are 7 pages that are analysed. This means that if a consideration is mentioned in more than 0.7 
pages it will be given a rank of 2 on the importance scale, since 0.7 pages is 10% of 7 pages. 
If a consideration is evaluated in more than 3.5 pages it will be ranked as 3, since 3.5 pages is 
50% of 7 pages. Fiscal considerations are addressed in more than 50% of the proposition 
pages. Transfer mispricing, administrative and efficiency considerations are evaluated in less 
than 10% of the pages, but are mentioned. Allocation and evasion considerations are not 
mentioned.  
The most recent change to the petroleum taxation was in a proposition from May 7th 2013. 
Here the Ministry proposed a retrenchment in the non-taxable income from 7.5% to 5.5%. 
This meant that the oil companies had to carry a larger part of their investments. The Ministry 
argued that the oil companies would be more cost conscious and “(…) more of the risk of 
overspending would be transferred to the companies” (Prop. 150 LS, 2012-2013, p. 14). With 
this change the Norwegian government would increase its profits from the petroleum activity 
(Prop. 150 LS, 2012-2013, pp. 14-15), which indicates that this change was made because of 
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fiscal considerations. These considerations are evaluated in more than 50% of the proposition 
pages, from page 12 to page 16. Hence this consideration is ranked as 3 on the importance 
scale. There are not made any other changes in this proposition. Transfer mispricing and 
administrative considerations are mentioned in the proposition, and are given a ranking of 1. 
Transfer mispricing are mentioned on page 11 in connection with the norm price system. 
Administrative considerations are mentioned on page 15, about the extra work the new 
regulations would have on the tax officials. Evasion, efficiency and allocation considerations 
are ranked as 0 since they are not mentioned. 
Table 4.8 Ranking of considerations (2013) 
Fiscal 3 
Allocation 0 
Efficiency 0 
Evasion 0 
Administrative 1 
Transfer mispricing 1 
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5 Discussion – The change over time 
The main question in this thesis has been: How important has transfer mispricing been in the 
construction of the current Norwegian tax regime for the petroleum industry? By looking at 
the change over time I might be able to answer this question. To do this I will sum up which 
of the considerations have been most important in the propositions I have included in the 
analysis. This helps strengthen my argument about how important transfer mispricing has 
been over the years. In the appendix there is a description of all the propositions that concerns 
the petroleum tax. At the end of this section I will sum up which of the considerations are 
most important in these propositions, and see if this coincides with the findings in chapter 
four.  
In order to have a similar system as Norway, expertise and integrity needs to be present. Or 
else simpler regimes are preferable (Osmundsen, 2010, p. 442). The Norwegian petroleum tax 
has been stable, even though the price of oil has risen in the recent years. Other countries, like 
the UK, have had several tax increases in the same period (Osmundsen, 2010, p. 437). This is 
a good strategy from the Norwegian government, because it should not introduce fiscal 
changes based on the fluctuations in the oil price. The tax base should be stable. This ensures 
interest from investors, and might also attract new ones (Nakhle 2010:114). The current 
petroleum tax system is based on the ordinary tax rules for land-based activity. Income from 
activity on the shelf has an ordinary corporate tax, which is 28%. An additional tax of 50% is 
also levied since the possibilities of return profits are very good. Therefore the marginal tax 
the corporations have to pay is 78% (Prop. 150 LS, 2012-2013, p. 11). In this regime it might 
have been easy for the multinational corporation to escape the high tax rate in Norway, 
because if two related corporations traded with each other, it would have been difficult for the 
tax authorities to evaluate if the price paid was the market price. But the norm price system 
that was introduced in 1975 is designed to stop transfer mispricing from happening on the 
Norwegian shelf. Let us have a closer look at which consideration has been most important 
over time. 
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Table 5.1 Overall ranking of each consideration 
  Year   
  1965 1975 1980 1986 1992 2000 2010 2013 Sum 
Fiscal 1 3 2 0 1 1 1 3 12 
Allocation 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Efficiency 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 12 
Evasion 0 2 1 0 0 3 1 0 7 
Administrative 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Transfer mispricing 0 2 1 1 1 0 3 1 9 
Table 5.1 indicates which of the considerations have been most important over the years. Here 
I have included all the propositions, and what rank each consideration received on the 
importance scale. At the far right side of the table there is a column called “sum”, where I 
have added up all the ranks each consideration has been given over the years. This is an index 
of the importance of each consideration over the entire period. This column shows that 
efficiency and fiscal considerations have been the most important consideration over time, 
since both of them have a sum of 12. But we can see that transfer mispricing considerations 
also have been important when changes have been made to the petroleum taxation, with a 
total of nine over the years. I will now go through each of the considerations and see what 
changes have been made over time.  
As was mentioned above, efficiency considerations have been very important over the years. 
We can see that this consideration has been mentioned or evaluated in almost all of the 
propositions, and it has been the most important consideration in three of the propositions 
(1965, 1986 and 1992). In the proposition from 2013 efficiency considerations were given a 
rank of 0, but in the propositions from 1980, 2000 and 2010 this consideration is given a rank 
of 1. With a rank of 3 in 1965 and 2 in the remaining propositions, efficiency considerations 
end up with a total of 12. This consideration has the same sum as fiscal considerations.  
It is especially in the first tax regime introduced by the Norwegian government that efficiency 
considerations played an important part. This regime was favourable for the oil companies, 
since there were only standard taxes. One reason for this was that the development of the oil 
in the North Sea was still uncertain at this point and it was geologically challenging to 
search/drill for oil in the area. To ensure that international oil companies would invest the 
officials could not have “super profit taxes”. The most important objective at this time was to 
attract investments from oil companies, and thereby increase the efficiency and profits from 
the shelf. But this was just an initial tax regime; the system has evolved, and gone through 
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many changes. At the planning stage for a prospected oil field, the government has an 
incentive to offer a generous tax regime in order to attract activity from international oil 
companies. This often changes when production starts, and the government implement higher 
taxes for the oil. After investing in an oil field it is more profitable for the oil company to 
continue production than to close it down. This is what is called the “obsolescing bargain” 
(Broadway & Keen 2010:15). This seems also to be true for the Norwegian case, since fiscal 
considerations were the most important in 1975.  
In the proposition from 1992, the government introduced the non-taxable income in part to 
attract new activity to the field, because asymmetric information can be a problem, since the 
oil company has a lot of expertise in the extraction of oil (costs, risks etc.) while governments 
might not. As Glomsrød & Osmundsen note: “Multinational oil companies may focus more 
on tax management than on petroleum resource management” (Glomsrød & Osmundsen 
2005:3). In a situation with only one company interested in the oil the government might be in 
a bad position, but when there are a number of companies wanting to have the license to look 
for oil this will not be a problem (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007:5).  
From table 5.1 we can see that fiscal considerations were very important in 1975 and 1980, 
since it has a ranking of 3 and 2 in these propositions. From 1986 to 2010 it was not the most 
important consideration when changes were made to the taxation system, since it has a rank of 
0 in 1986, and 1 in the following propositions. However in 2013 it is given a ranking of 3, 
indicating that this has become more important in newer time. Fiscal considerations end up 
with a total of 12, which is as mentioned before a high total score. As my analysis results 
show fiscal considerations have played an important part in several propositions. In the tax 
regime introduced in 1975, which is the first comprehensive taxation law for the petroleum 
industry, the government wanted to secure more of the profits. This was done by introducing 
a surtax, and as time has gone by this tax has increased regularly. As I mentioned above the 
surtax rate is now on 50%, and it has not changed since 1992 (Prop. 150 LS, 2012-2013, p. 
11).    
Allocation, evasion and administrative considerations have not shown great importance. 
Allocation considerations are rarely mentioned or evaluated in the propositions I have chosen 
to focus in my analysis. This consideration ends up with a total of 2, since it is ranked as 1 in 
1975 and 1980. These findings indicate that allocation considerations have so far not been 
important when changes have been made to the Norwegian petroleum taxation. Evasion 
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considerations have not been very important. These considerations are given a ranking of 3 
and 2 once, but in the remaining propositions they are only given 1 or 0. Evasion 
considerations end up with a total of 7. It is especially in the proposition from 2000 that 
evasion considerations were important, with a ranking of three. This was in the connection 
with new rules regarding the allocation of financial posts. Even though administrative 
considerations have not been the most important consideration over the years, these 
considerations have been mentioned in all propositions except for 1965, and are also given a 
ranking of 2 in one proposition. Administrative considerations end up with a total of 8, which 
indicates that this has been more important than evasion and allocation considerations.  
 
Since my main focus in this thesis is transfer mispricing I have included figure 5.1 to get a 
better sense of how the importance of it has changed over the years. Transfer mispricing 
considerations end up with a total of 9 on the importance scale. In 1975 and 2010 transfer 
mispricing had a strong focus, but in 1965 and 2000 these considerations were not mentioned. 
In 1980, 1986, 1992 and 2013 transfer mispricing considerations are mentioned. But there 
was not an evaluation about the current situation for this consideration. These findings 
indicate that transfer mispricing considerations have not been the most important 
consideration when changes have been made to the petroleum taxation system, but I argue 
that they have been important. Since its implementation in 1975, there have not been any 
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changes to the norm price system, but this does not mean that it has not been important. On 
the contrary, transfer mispricing seems to be a constant problem for host countries. The fact 
that the norm price system still is in place, and has not been changed, supports this argument.  
One thing that might help uncover why transfer mispricing was not important at the time of 
the first proposition in 1965, was that before the mid-1960s there was no market price for oil, 
making it hard for the producer states to negotiate how much the oil corporations had to pay 
in taxes. Import quotas and government production determined the price of crude oil in the 
US. In other areas, crude oil was transferred within the firm to their own refinery, or traded 
between the large oil corporations. Tax paid to the producer countries was then calculated by 
using a benchmark called “posted price” that was set by the oil firms. The tax per barrel was 
set at 50% of that figure (Mitchell, 2013, p. 167-168). The oil corporations had a lot of power 
at this time, which Hudson’s (2000) example also showed.  
The arm’s length price is, as mentioned earlier, the price set by two unrelated corporations. 
The norm price system introduced in 1975 is an approach to the arm’s length principle, and 
this principle says that the price should be the same as if the two companies were unrelated 
parties negotiating in a normal market (Tax Justice Network, 2013). This approach to dealing 
with transfer mispricing is endorsed by the OECD and the United Nations Tax committee, 
and it is not likely that they will embrace a new approach (The Economist, 2013). The norm 
prices are set by “Petroleumsprisrådet”, and are supposed to correspond with the prices two 
independent parties pay when trading with each other (Prop. 150 LS, 2013, p. 14; Woldseth & 
Syversen, 1978, pp. 5-7). “Petroleumsprisrådet” meets once every quarter to determine norm 
prices for the previous quarter (Olje- og Energidepartementet, 2013). If the sale price is higher 
than the norm price, it is tax-free. But if the sale price is lower than the norm price the 
corporation is levied a tax. Up to now norm prices have been set for propane and crude oil 
(Prop. 150 LS, 2013, p. 14). The Norwegian officials use guidelines provided by the OECD in 
this process, because (in effect) the norm price is the same as the arm’s length price endorsed 
by the OECD. In the Tax Act §13-1 it is pointed out that the guidelines on transfer pricing 
should be followed, as long as they fit (Skatteloven (2014), §13-1). This particular reference 
has been there since 2008 (OECD, 2013). I have not found any indications that the norm price 
system will be replaced with any other arrangements that could be used to escape the 
problems that are related to transfer mispricing.  
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Many argue that increased transparency in transactions between governments and 
multinational corporations is a solution to transfer mispricing. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a coalition of governments and corporations that works to 
improve openness concerning revenues from extractive industries like oil. Governments 
disclose payments and taxes received from oil, mining and gas companies in an annual report 
from the EITI. Citizens can then control how much they actually receive from their natural 
resources (EITI 2013). Norway delivered its fifth EITI report December 20th 2012. This report 
contains information on how much oil corporations have paid to the state in 2012, and also 
how much each company has paid to the Norwegian government (Regjeringen, 2013b). A 
combination of this initiative and the norm price system seems like a good solution to 
controlling transfer mispricing.  
As my analysis results show the Norwegian government has tried to organize the tax system 
in several ways over the years. From 1965 there was a tax based on how much oil was 
pumped; a so-called production-based taxation. From 1986 to 2000 this tax was phased out, 
and it is not a part of the tax on oil. There are many reasons why the production-based 
taxation was a part of the initial regime, but was faded out. Glomsrød & Osmundsen (2005, p. 
2) assert that this tax is easy to administer, and this is probably why it was introduced in the 
first place. As the Norwegian tax regime has matured and the tax officials have obtained a lot 
of experience in taxing multinational oil companies, they have removed elements from the 
taxation that are non-neutral and force the oil companies to close down petroleum fields 
prematurely (Glomsrød & Osmundsen, 2005, p. 2). In NOU 2000:18 they point to this issue 
with the production based taxation. Saying that it can affect the decision to shut down fields 
as an alternative to continue the production. The committee indicated that this influence is 
modest, but that the companies’ willingness to make additional investments in existing fields 
could be affected by this kind of taxation (NOU 2000:18, p. 153). Developing countries often 
use royalties to ensure that they get a share of the oil revenue immediately. It might take a lot 
of time to develop an oil field, meaning that the oil company does not have any profits in the 
first period of production. With production based taxation the developing country gets a share 
of the revenue from the onset (Johnston, 2007, p. 71). Some regard production-based taxes to 
be the simplest to administer (Calder, 2010, p. 320; Glomsrød & Osmundsen, 2005, p. 2; 
Radon, 2007, p. 104), making them very popular among developing countries. But it requires 
the government to have complex and sensitive equipment, because it has to monitor how 
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much oil is produced and the quality of the oil that is pumped up (Calder, 2010, p. 320), so 
there are challenges with this type of taxation as well. 
Table 5.2: Most important consideration over time 
Proposition Consideration Proposition Consideration 
Ot.prp. nr. 47 (1964-65) Efficiency Ot.prp. nr. 12 (1994-95)  Fiscal 
Ot.prp. nr. 26 (1974-75)  Fiscal Ot.prp. nr. 47 (1995-96)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 70 (1976-77)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 36 (1997-98)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 19 (1977-78)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 86 (1998-99)  Administrative 
Ot.prp. nr. 27 (1978-79)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 86 (2000-2001)  Evasion 
Ot.prp. nr. 60 (1978-79)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 16 (2001-2002)  Efficiency 
Ot.prp. nr. 18 (1979-80)  Administrative Ot.prp. nr. 34 (2001-2002)  Administrative 
Ot.prp. nr. 37 (1979-80)  Fiscal Ot.prp. nr. 84 (2001-2002)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 26 (1980-81) Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2002-2003)  Administrative 
Ot.prp. nr. 42 (1981-82)  Fiscal Ot.prp. nr. 92 (2002-2003)  Administrative 
Ot.prp. nr. 78 (1981-82)  Evasion Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2003-2004)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 7 (1983-84) Efficiency Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2004-2005)  Efficiency 
Ot.prp. nr. 19 (1983-84)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2005-2006)  Transfer mispricing 
Ot.prp. nr. 60 (1983-84) Evasion Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2006-2007)  Evasion 
Ot.prp. nr. 33 (1985-86)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 61 (2006-2007)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 3 (1986-87)  Efficiency Ot.prp. nr. 59 (2007-2008)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 61 (1986-87)  Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2008-2009)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 12 (1987-88) Not assigned Ot.prp. nr. 95 (2008-2009) Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 60 (1987-88)  Not assigned Prop. 1 L (2009-2010)  Not assigned 
Ot.prp. nr. 34 (1990-91)  Efficiency Prop. 126 LS (2009-2010)  Transfer mispricing 
Ot.prp. nr. 12 (1991-92)  Efficiency Prop. 150 LS (2012-2013) Efficiency 
Ot.prp. nr. 64 (1991-92)  Not assigned 	  	   	  	  
From table 5.2 we can see that in 20 of the propositions I have not assigned any specific 
consideration. This is not done because it was not possible to conclude which of the six 
considerations were most important in these cases. Some of the propositions include technical 
changes, like in 1977 when misconceptions about the depreciation were clarified (Ot.prp. nr. 
19, 1977-1978, pp. 1-2), but it is difficult to say if this was done because of administrative, 
efficiency or fiscal considerations. Other propositions contain information about taxation 
rules for foreign workers (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1978-1979, p. 7), and it has been hard to pinpoint 
one of the considerations in these cases. This is the reason why as many as 20 propositions 
have not been assigned a consideration.  
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Table 5.3 Summary of most important consideration 
Efficiency 8 propositions 
Administrative 5 propositions 
Fiscal 4 propositions 
Evasion 4 propositions 
Transfer mispricing 2 propositions 
Allocation 0 propositions 
If we take a closer look at table 5.2 we can see that many of the same considerations are 
important in the propositions in the appendix as in my analysis results. In table 5.3 I have 
made a summary of how many times each consideration has been the most important. In this 
summary I have also included the propositions in the appendix, and this strengthens my 
findings from table 5.1. We can see that efficiency considerations have also been important in 
many of the propositions included in the appendix. All in all we can see that efficiency 
considerations end up being the most important consideration in this table, since efficiency 
considerations have been the most important consideration in eight propositions. 
Administrative considerations have been the most important consideration in five 
propositions, and fiscal considerations have been the most important consideration in four 
propositions. Transfer mispricing has only been the most important consideration in two 
propositions. Allocation considerations are not the most important consideration in any of the 
propositions I have identified. But evasion considerations stand out, because these 
considerations have been important in three of the propositions in the appendix, while they 
were only the most important consideration in one of the propositions in my analysis. Evasion 
considerations might be more important than my results show, but there is no reason to 
believe that I would have reached a different conclusion about the importance of transfer 
mispricing.     
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6 Conclusion 
Pak’s study from 2012 found that from 2000 to 2010 over $110 billion have disappeared 
through mispricing of crude oil in the EU and the US (Pak, 2012, p. 36). Because of the high 
tax level on the Norwegian shelf there are strong incentives for the enterprises to transfer 
incomes to a low-tax regime (NOU 2000:18, p. 159). But oil resources on the Norwegian 
shelf belong to the fellowship, and the surplus in this sector is important for the future 
financing of the welfare society. The tax system in the petroleum sector should therefore 
secure the extraordinary profit for the Norwegian people, since they are the owners of the 
resources (Prop. 150 LS, 2012-2013, p. 12). This is why I have turned focus to transfer 
mispricing in this thesis, which is a strategy that shifts income out of the host country 
(Glomsrød & Osmundsen, 2005, p. 3).  
In this thesis I have tracked each change in the taxation of petroleum extraction on the 
Norwegian shelf from 1965 in an attempt to find more information about transfer mispricing, 
and how the Norwegian tax regime is built up in order to escape this problem. Norway was 
chosen as a case because it has been able to keep a large portion of the profits from the 
petroleum extraction within its borders. In 2007 it had 31% of its total income from the 
petroleum industry (Osmundsen, 2010, p. 435). By creating a typology with six 
considerations, and testing how important each of these have been in eight cases, I have tried 
to answer the question: how important has transfer mispricing been in the construction of the 
current Norwegian tax regime for petroleum? My findings show that transfer mispricing has 
not been the most important consideration when changes have been made to the tax regime. I 
find that efficiency and fiscal considerations have been the most important considerations. 
But transfer mispricing has been an important consideration for tax officials when they have 
made changes to the petroleum taxation system. This evaluation is based on the simple fact 
that the Norwegian tax officials have established a way of pricing petroleum, and supervising 
the transactions between the companies operating on the Norwegian shelf. The norm price 
system is the Norwegian approach to the arm’s length principle, which is a principle that 
states that the price should be the same as if the two companies involved in the transaction 
“(…) were indeed two unrelated parties negotiating in a normal market, and not part of the 
same corporate structure” (Tax Justice Network, 2013). Tax rules often reflect the current 
price situation and prospects at a certain time, but the norm price system has not changed 
since its implementation in 1975 (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1974-1975, pp. 15-16), and this fact 
 54 
strengthens my argument that transfer mispricing is a problem that is constant over time, 
which requires there to be elements in the taxation system that controls transactions between 
the multinational corporations operating on the shelf. Based on findings in this thesis I 
conclude with this hypothesis: Transfer mispricing is not the most important consideration 
when changes are made in a petroleum tax regime, but it is a problem that is constant over 
time, and has to be dealt with if the host countries do not want to lose revenue from the 
petroleum extraction.  
I chose to do a hypothesis-generating case study because there is very little theory on transfer 
mispricing and the evidence of it is impressionistic and partial (Dunning, 1981, p. 31). 
Furthermore I employed a testing where I ranked the importance of each consideration based 
on percentages of pages that was dedicated to each of them in eight propositions. The testing 
of each proposition could have been done in another way. E.g. instead of dividing the 
proposition into percentages, one could have counted how many times each consideration is 
mentioned in the proposition. The operationalizing of importance is not done in this way 
because in many of the cases the considerations are not specifically mentioned, and that 
meant that all of the propositions had to be read thoroughly in order to identify what 
consideration was most important in each case. In retrospect I see that the ranking could have 
gone from 0 to 5 instead of 0 to 3. The ranking I employed in my analysis made it easy to get 
a ranking of 1, since it only required that a consideration was mentioned in a proposition. The 
same goes for receiving a rank of 2, which required 10% of the proposition pages to contain 
information about a specific consideration.  With a ranking from 0 to 5 it might have been 
easier to see if one of the considerations was more prominent than the others over time. The 
case selection could have had an impact on my results. The eight propositions I have chosen 
to focus on are spread across time, and might therefore give a sense of how important transfer 
mispricing has been in the construction of the current Norwegian tax regime for petroleum. 
But we would have had the best results if all the propositions had been analysed just as 
thoroughly as the eight I have selected, but this would have taken too much time and space.  
Fiscal, allocation, efficiency, evasion and administrative considerations were chosen because 
an Official Norwegian Report (NOU 1989:14, p. 93) highlighted them as being important 
considerations in a tax regime. I added the transfer mispricing considerations because I 
wanted to turn focus to this problem. But this could have affected my results, since transfer 
mispricing might overlap with the other considerations. E.g. in the proposition from 2010 
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(Prop. 126 LS, 2009-2010, pp. 26-27) I have ranked transfer mispricing as 3 on the 
importance scale, while fiscal considerations are given a rank of 1. But if transfer mispricing 
had not been a consideration I might have given the other considerations a different rank. In 
this example it would have been logical to give fiscal considerations a rank of 3 instead of 1, 
since the change would have a positive effect on fiscal considerations. This is a problem with 
the testing I have chosen. But there are also some issues with the other considerations I 
employ in the analysis. Allocation considerations are supposed to make the distribution of the 
profits between the state and the oil companies fair, but my testing shows that they are rarely 
mentioned in the propositions. This might be because it is hard to identify these 
considerations in a proposition, since views of the oil companies are not included in most of 
the cases, and that makes it difficult to say that a change is made to make the distribution 
fairer. The propositions usually only contains the government’s understanding of fair and this 
might not coincide with the oil companies’ understanding of fair. Allocation considerations 
should therefore be evaluated from both sides in future research. But I argue that these 
concerns do not change my conclusion that transfer mispricing is a problem that is constant 
over time.  
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Appendix 
1977 
In 1977 the government implemented new rules regarding taxation of foreign workers 
working on the Norwegian shelf. The oil companies were instructed to give information about 
all of their workers (Ot.prp. nr. 70, 1976-1977, pp. 12-13).  
In 1977 the government also clarified misconceptions concerning the depreciation rules 
(Ot.prp. nr. 19, 1977-1978, pp. 1-2).   
1978 
In 1978 oil companies with extraction permits could not get deductions on the income tax 
assessment for covering future expenses on removing installations. This was due to the 
uncertainty at this time about what will happen when the concession time is over. The 
Ministry of Finance needed more time to evaluate this subject (Ot.prp. nr. 27, 1978-1979, p. 
2).  
1979 
In 1979 the government changed the taxation rules concerning foreign workers on the 
Norwegian shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1978-1979, p. 7). 
In 1979 the government opened up the opportunity for other public authorities to receive 
information about companies and persons that were taxable on the Norwegian shelf. This was 
done because the Ministry for Oil and Energy could not get this information from the tax 
board. It was necessary for the Ministry to have as much information as possible about the 
companies, to ensure that the estimates in the propositions to the Parliament about future 
taxes were to be correct (Ot.prp. nr. 18, 1979-1980, p. 11).  
1981 
In 1981 the government evaluated if there should be implemented rules about limitations in 
the right to deduct interest paid, but no changes were made at this time. The Ministry argued 
that the options they had had to be closely mapped out before they could take any decisions in 
this question (Ot.prp. nr. 26, 1980-1981, p. 48).   
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1982 
In 1982 the transportation of petroleum through pipelines to Norway was taken in to the 
geographical sphere of the petroleum tax law. This was done because the plant that was under 
construction at Kårstø would not be subject to surtax. Activity on Norwegian soil was not 
under the petroleum tax laws sphere; this would mean that the Norwegian state could lose a 
lot of revenues. In addition to this the Ministry of Finance sharpened three other paragraphs in 
the tax law: the rules about conditional tax exemption, that the tax in instalments was no to be 
treated differently in the capital assessment than the advance tax and that “Oljeskattenemnda” 
(the oil tax board) could reassess the taxation of profits made before 1980 (Ot.prp. nr. 42, 
1981-1982, pp. 1-4).   
Specifications were given in 1982 about where financial profits and expenses should be 
allocated. The oil companies’ profits and expenses of variations in the exchange rate and 
interests were to be treated equally when it comes to choosing which taxation area they were 
allocated to. These types of financial profits would after this proposition be laid to the 
taxation regime on the shelf. The Ministry argued that this arrangement would lead to 
delimitation in the obligation to pay surtax to the state. This was more consistent with the 
initial conditions in the petroleum tax law (Ot.prp. nr. 78, 1981-1982, pp. 2-4). The Ministry 
also demanded the companies to appropriate to a reserve fund the activity that was taxable in 
Norway. In some tax agreements there were rules that gave a branch of a foreign company the 
right to claim deductions for dividend payments in the income that is taxed in Norway, as if 
the company was a Norwegian company. A reserve fund would make it easier for the tax 
officials to know if the oil companies were following the rules (Ot.prp. nr. 78, 1981-1982, p. 
1).  
1983 
In connection with a water injection project on the Ekofisk field, the Ministry implemented 
temporary amendments to the petroleum tax law. More specifically the licensee could deduct 
investments in connection with this project earlier than the petroleum tax law had allowed. 
The companies would then receive their income faster, while the tax payments to the state 
would be delayed. This was done because there were a lot of risks involved in starting this 
project, since water injection was a new method. The government wanted to give the 
companies incentives to start the project (Ot.prp. nr. 7, 1983-1984, p. 2).  
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In 1983 the petroleum tax law went through a few changes that were aimed at making the 
depreciation rules easier to understand and practising (Ot.prp. nr. 19, 1983-1984, p. 7).  
1984 
The Ministry of Finance proposed in 1984 that property tax on installations or operating 
assets in connection with transportation of petroleum through pipelines could not be collected. 
The Ministry believed that the oil companies were levied a sufficient tax, and that the 
municipalities would benefit from the increased activity the oil industry brought with it. But 
there were not made any decisions to this matter in this proposition (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1983-
1984, p. 4). Furthermore the Ministry proposed measures that would make it easier for oil 
companies to reorganize their operations. This was done because the government 
implemented rules that ordered the oil companies to run their operations through a Norwegian 
based company. If a company has operations in both Norway and in its home country it 
makes tax assessment complicated for the Norwegian tax officials, because it is difficult to 
allocate the profits and expenses between the countries. The officials would have had to look 
at the companies’ balance sheets abroad, but this could have been both legally and practically 
difficult. Practically difficult because the work would be very labour-intensive, and legally 
difficult since many countries have accounting acts and tax acts where the authorities are not 
allowed to disclose this kind of information (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1983-1984, p. 5).  
Evasion considerations are not specifically mentioned, but the proposition emphasises how 
difficult the tax assessment is for the officials in Norway when companies have operations in 
several countries: “In cases like this it might be difficult to divide the companies’ profits and 
expenses between the different countries” (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1983-1984, p. 5). The change was 
made out of administrative considerations, since it aims at making tax assessment easier for 
the Norwegian officials. But evasion concerns are the underlying problem that motivated this 
change in the current system. This was due to the large focus in the proposition on oil 
companies having subsidiaries in other countries, and that tax assessment is very difficult in 
these circumstances.  
1986 
In 1986 the Ministry of Finance addressed the issue concerning removal of devices and plants 
on the Norwegian shelf. More specifically the Ministry stipulated how the expenses from this 
were to be allocated between the state and the companies (Ot.prp. nr. 33, 1985-1986, pp. 3-4). 
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The Ministry had evaluated if the tax system could be used to allocate the removal expenses 
between the state and the oil companies, but this would affect the oil companies’ cost 
consciousness. E.g. the companies could have been given tax-free allocations to cover this 
expense in the future. But it was not known how long a project would last, since new 
developments could prolong a field’s durability. This would then require a specialized tax 
committee working with controlling how much the company would get tax-free and that the 
information given by the companies was correct. Using the tax system was not a realistic 
option (Ot.prp. nr. 33, 1985-1986, pp. 12). The Ministry settled on a solution where the 
companies are responsible of removing devices and equipment from the shelf. The 
government then covers its portion of the expenses through direct payments as the expenses 
accumulate. This alternative was chosen because the oil companies had a lot of expertise in 
this area, and it would not require a new extensive governmental system (Ot.prp. nr. 33, 1985-
1986, pp. 14).  
1987 
New regulations concerning change of ownership on the shelf were implemented in 1987. 
These amendments were aimed at clarifying the tax-related issues that arise when ownership 
of a license is changed (Ot.prp. nr. 61, 1986-1987, pp. 4-5) and reduce the tax-related barriers 
that exist for ownership transfers (Ot.prp. nr. 61, 1986-1987, p. 12). Furthermore it was aimed 
at making the tax treatment equal for all kinds of ownership transfers (Ot.prp. nr. 61, 1986-
1987, p. 11). In order to achieve these objectives the Ministry proposed that a transfer of 
ownership could not happen unless the King had given his consent to the tax-related effects. 
The King was also given the ability to modify the tax law (Ot.prp. nr. 61, 1986-1987, p. 22). 
The Ministry implemented central tax assessment of oil companies without permanent 
connection to the kingdom. This was done to “(…) get a safer and quicker follow-up of this 
taxpayer group (…)” (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1987-1988, p. 1).  
1988 
The complaints board increased to seven members, and was also given the opportunity to 
divide into two branches (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1987-1988, p. 40). The motivating factor for this 
change was to reduce the case processing time for complaints about tax decisions after the 
petroleum tax act for companies that extract oil or transport oil through pipelines (Ot.prp. nr. 
60, 1987-1988, p. 3). Changes made in this proposition were not expected to bring about any 
direct economic consequences (Ot.prp. nr. 60, 1987-1988, p. 4). 
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1991 
The Ministry of Finance and Customs implemented a new arrangement were the companies 
working with extraction and transportation of petroleum could ask for binding prior 
statements from “Oljeskattenemnda” (the oil tax board) about the future taxation on a field 
(Ot.prp. nr. 34, 1990-1991, p. 22). One motivating factor for this arrangement was that it 
made it more predictable for the oil companies to invest on the Norwegian shelf, and this 
could increase the efficiency on the shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 34, 1990-1991, p. 8). 
1992 
In 1992 branches were placed on equal terms with Norwegian private companies with regard 
to calculating and paying dividend (Ot.prp. nr. 64, 1991-1992, p. 54). The Ministry of Finance 
and Customs argued, “The economic framework conditions for participants on the Norwegian 
shelf should to a great extent be the same however the activity is organized” (Ot.prp. nr. 64, 
1991-1992, p. 39). 
1994 
The Ministry of Finance introduced a minimum capital rule, which was meant to limit the tax-
related imbalance that made debt financing favourable for the extraction companies. This 
regulation could reduce the possibility the companies had of financing activity with loans 
since it set tax-based limits for deductions for financial costs. The tax assessment would be 
more demanding for the officials, since the rule would be a new element in the petroleum tax 
act. The Ministry argued that this additional work was necessary to secure that reduction in 
equity capital would not undermine the tax base in the petroleum sector (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1994-
1995, p. 20). The reason why the government wanted to reduce loan financing on the shelf 
was that this type of financing was only levied a tax of 28%, while financing with capital was 
levied a tax of 78% (Ot.prp. nr. 12, 1994-1995, p. 3).  
1996 
Changes were made to §10 in the petroleum tax act, which concerns transferring production 
facilities from the oil companies to the state (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1995-1996, p. 3). This change 
addressed when the oil companies could claim deductions from removing production facilities 
on the shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1995-1996, p. 8). A few phrases in the petroleum tax act were 
also changed, so that they would be more clearly understood and not misinterpreted by the oil 
companies (Ot.prp. nr. 47, 1995-1996, p. 5). 
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1997 
In 1997 the Ministry of Finance implemented special rules for taxing rented moveable 
production units, which were aimed at making tax treatment of owned and rented production 
units more equal. This change led to a more complicated taxation system, with more work for 
the tax officials (Ot.prp. nr. 36, 1997-1998, p. 24).  
1999 
The King had had the power of attorney to determine more detailed regulations or resolutions 
for the petroleum taxation, but this was changed in 1999. The Finance Ministry was given this 
power of attorney because many of the resolutions were very technical. This would make the 
system more effective, since all the regulations did not have to be presented in the cabinet 
meetings (Ot.prp. nr. 86, 1998-1999, pp. 3-4). 
2001 
The Ministry of Finance increased the depreciation percentage for pipelines and production 
equipment used in transportation and production of gas that was to be cooled down to liquid 
form in a new cool down plant. This was done to give the companies incentives to invest in 
this project (Ot.prp. nr. 16, 2001-2002, pp. 2-3).  
In 2001 “Oljeskattekontoret” (the oil tax office) was given the responsibility of representing 
the state in lawsuits concerning tax assessment issues. The Finance Ministry had this role 
before 2001 (Ot.prp. nr. 34, 2001-2002, p. 14).  
2002 
In 2002 changes were made to the composition of “Oljeskattenemnda” (the oil tax board) 
(Ot.prp. nr 1, 2002-2003, pp. 47-48). The Ministry for Finance also proposed a geographical 
limit for certain depreciation arrangements in the petroleum tax law. In specific this entailed 
that depreciation rules for investments in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plants could only be 
given if the plant was situated within a defined geographical area. This was necessary to 
specify because the EFTA surveillance authority meant that the current arrangement was 
government support, which is not allowed within EFTA (Ot.prp. nr. 84, 2001-2002, pp. 2-3). 
The composition of “Oljeskattenemnda” (the oil tax board) was changed in 2002. There was 
not going to be personal substitutes anymore. If one of the permanent members of the board 
was away, any of the five substitutes could be called in (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2002-2003, p. 47). 
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2003 
The Ministry of Finance set aside the law concerning subsidies to remove equipment on the 
shelf. Instead the Ministry proposed that when activity that is levied surtax is ended, the state 
should pay the tax value of the uncovered deficit that comes from expenses of removing 
equipment on the shelf (Ot.prp. nr. 92, 2002-2003, p. 6). One of the reasons why it changed 
was that it was complicated to administer for both the government officials and the oil 
companies, since it was necessary to have other rules and systems for calculation and 
payment of the subsidies (Ot.prp. nr. 92, 2002-2003, pp. 12-13). The Ministry also proposed 
that when operations that are levied surtax are sold, the additional non-taxable income is 
transferred to the company that takes over the operations (Ot.prp. nr. 92, 2002-2003, p. 19). 
A part of §6, concerning the Ministry’s opportunity to give more detailed regulations on 
allocation of deductions for distributed proceeds, was removed in 2003. This was done 
because the rules about distributed proceeds were repealed in 1992, so it did not have any 
effect anymore (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2003-2004, p. 167). 
2004 
In 2004 the Ministry of Finance implemented new tax regulations on the shelf, which were 
aimed at increasing the extraction of oil from existing fields. More specifically the Ministry 
wanted to decrease entrance barriers to the petroleum activity on the Norwegian shelf. They 
proposed a yearly payment from the state to companies that are not being taxed, based on the 
tax value of the searching expenses. The intention was that new actors could operate on equal 
terms with established companies (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2004-2005, pp. 121-122).   
2005 
In 2005 the government removed the tax exemption on free meals for workers on the shelf 
(Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2005-2006, p. 26). In addition to this there were implemented new rules for gas 
sales. The Ministry of Finance proposed to introduce a voluntary system for binding prior 
statements from the oil companies for determining gas prices when companies sell to a 
subsidiary (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2005-2006, p. 98). This change would give assurances to the 
government that the posted price coincide with the market price, and would also help 
Norwegian officials to take better decisions concerning production and sales of gas (Ot.prp. 
nr. 1, 2005-2006, pp. 112-113). A more detailed description of setting the price for natural gas 
can be found under section 4.7.  
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2006 
The government changed the rules for net financial items in 2006. Net financial items mainly 
include interest costs and interest profits, and also exchange losses and exchange gains. The 
oil companies had strong incentives to finance activity on the shelf with loans instead of 
equity capital. This was because the tax rate for lender was 28%, while the tax rate for 
companies that were levied surtax had a tax rate of 78%. The oil companies could then 
achieve a tax advantage by financing the activity on the shelf with interest-bearing debt. The 
Ministry of Finance suggested that the interest charges and currency items on interest-bearing 
debt was to be treated separately, and that the deduction for interest charges in the income that 
was subject to the surtax was to be set directly based on the relationship between tax-related 
capital on the shelf and interest-bearing debt (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2006-2007, p. 101). I.e. the rules 
had to be changed because of evasion consideration, so that the oil companies could not evade 
Norwegian taxes.  
Furthermore there were made changes to the CO2 fee levied on the Norwegian shelf (Ot.prp. 
nr. 1, 2006-2007, p. 119). 
2007 
In 2007 the law concerning the ability to mortgage on payments was sharpened. This change 
had no economic or administrative consequences (Ot.prp. nr. 61, 2006-2007, p. 29).  
2008 
In 2008 there were made changes to the payment arrangement for the petroleum tax. The tax 
had been paid two times, but was increased to six times each year in this proposition because 
the payments were very high and created uncertainty in the money market (Ot.prp. nr. 59, 
2007-2008, pp. 14-15). 
Changes were made so that if the oil company won a complaints case in “Oljeskattenemnda” 
(the oil tax board), “Oljeskattekontoret” (the oil tax office) would have to pay for the legal 
costs (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2008-2009, p. 159).  
The petroleum taxation lacked clear regulations about taxing properties that companies 
moved to another country. I.e. the Norwegian government had no legal authority to tax these 
assets. Companies therefore had strong incentives to move certain properties to other 
countries with lower tax rates, thereby evading the Norwegian tax (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2008-2009, 
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p.50). An example of this is movement of business assets to another country’s shelf or 
transferring rights to immaterial assets (e.g. patents) abroad (Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2008-2009, p. 38). 
But changes were not made at this time.  
2009 
In 2009 §9 in the petroleum tax act was repealed. This paragraph stated that the Ministry of 
Finance could approve that a company that was liable to taxation, could transfer its own tax 
position to another taxpayer, and that the proceeds from this transfer should be completely or 
partly be exempted from the income tax. §9 was repealed because §10 in the petroleum tax 
act addressed the same issue, and §9 was therefore superfluous (Ot.prp. nr. 95, 2008-2009, p. 
12).  
In 2009 the Finance Ministry proposed changes about regulations concerning companies that 
assume responsibility of an extraction permit from another company. These changes had no 
effects on revenues to the state (Ot.prp. nr. 95, 2008-2009, pp. 10-11).  
2010 
In 2010 the government dissolved the obligation to pay employers’ contribution of services 
from foreign employees for work on foreign ships in connection with extraction and searching 
for petroleum  (Prop. 1 L, 2009-2010, p. 88). 
